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I.

Introduction
Sonia Sotomayor was nominated as an Associate Justice to the Supreme Court of the

United States by President Barack Obama on May 26, 2009. 1 Justice Sotomayor's subsequent
confirmation and assumption of her role as Associate Justice on August 8, 2009 made Supreme
Court history as Justice Sotomayor is only the third woman and the first Hispanic to sit on this
nation's most prestigious bench. 2 Justice Sotomayor was well suited to become a Supreme Court
Justice as she brought 18 years of federal judgeship experience with her to the Supreme Court as
she previously served as a federal district judge in the Southern District of New York, and as a
circuit judge serving the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 3 Along with her occupational
experience, Justice Sotomayor brought with her the many experiences she gained throughout her
life growing up in the Bronxdale Housing Projects in the Bronx, New York, her Ivy League
undergraduate education at Princeton University, and her Ivy League legal education which was
obtained at Yale Law School. 4 These experiences have influenced and continue to shape her
jurisprudence on the Supreme Court as hints of her strong academic resume, her devotion to
careful, commonsense application of the law to the facts, and her diverse roots in the Bronx can
be found in her written opinions.
This paper will analyze how Justice Sotomayor's life experiences and her diligence in
performing her role as an Associate Justice have led her to apply a no-nonsense approach to her
legal jurisprudence. It will be demonstrated that Justice Sotomayor's background and her desire
to become a judge strongly influences her legal perspective and analysis. Justice Sotomayor

1

Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court of the U.S.,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about!biographies.aspx (last visited Nov. 27, 2013).
2
Id.; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Sotomayor, a Trailblazer and a Dreamer, N.Y. Times, May 26, 2009, available at
www .nytimes.com/2009/05/27/us/politics/27websotomayor .html.
3 Id.
4
Sonia Sotomayor, My Beloved World 13 (Alfred A. Knopf2013).
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employs a narrow, diligent, and in depth analysis of the law and facts in front of her in order to
draw commonsense conclusions that are often technical, incremental, and exhaustive. 5 The
structure of Justice Sotomayor's opinions, concurrences, and dissents are fairly predictable; a
thorough analysis of the facts of the case, a description of the case's procedural posture, an indepth and technical explanation of the current law, an acknowledgment of the oppositions stance,
an often narrow, commonsense application of the law to the facts, and a conclusion.
Pundits theorize that Justice Sotomayor is squarely entrenched in the liberal bloc of the
Supreme Court. 6 However, an examination of her jurisprudence indicates that Justice Sotomayor
applies a methodical analysis to the cases and controversies on which she is sitting to reach
conclusions based soundly on the law and logic. Justice Sotomayor provided insight into her
legal analysis in an interview with Scott Pelley for the program, 60 Minutes, when asked if the
constitution is a living document or should be read strictly. Justice Sotomayor stated:
[T]here are provisions that are very general in the constitution.
You can't have an unreasonable search and seizure. What does
unreasonable mean? What's a search and seizure? On those three
words; search, seizure, and unreasonable, law books are filled.
Shelves and shelves of them are filled. And so to talk about strict
interpretation or living constitution, those are not words I use, and
they're not words that I think have much meaning, because what
you are doing is interpreting new facts to an established law, that
in part has been given meaning in precedent, and that in part has a
historical background, and you're drawing from all of that toolbox,
of precedence, history (some of my colleagues don't rely on
history, others do), and from statutory construction principles. It is
not about reading words strictly or about living constitution, it's
about giving meaning on the basis of facts that are presented to
you. 7

5

Adam Liptak, Nominee's Rulings are Exhaustive but Often Narrow, N.Y. Times, May 26,2009, available at
www .nytimes.com/2009/05/27/us/politics/27judge.html.
6
Stolberg, supra note 2, at 6.
7
Interview with Scott Pelley, Correspondent, 60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast Jan. 13, 2013), available at
www .cbsnews .com/news/justice-sotomayor-prefers-sonia-from-the-bronx -09-06-20 13/.
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Exemplified by Justice Sotomayor's words on 60 Minutes, she employs all of the tools at her
disposal to reach conclusions regarding facts she is presented with that is based on law, logic,
and commonsense. Through an analysis of Justice Sotomayor's upbringing, early life,
undergraduate and legal education, and Supreme Court case law authored by her, this paper will
provide comprehensive analyses on her commonsense application of the law to the specific facts
presented to her. 8

II.

Biography
A. Justice Sotomayor's Early Life
Sonia Sotomayor was born in the Bronx, New York on June 25, 1954 to her Puerto Rican

parents, Juan and Celina Sotomayor. 9 Justice Sotomayor's parents immigrated to the United

°

States in 1944. 1 Celina Baez came to the United States with the Women's Army Corps, and
Juan Sotomayor and his family came in search of work as part of a large, economic driven
migration to the United States from Puerto Rico. 11 Sotomayor has a brother, Juan Luis
Sotomayor Jr., M.D., whom she called Junior and was born three years after Justice Sotomayor
in 1957. 12 The Sotomayor's moved into the Bronxdale Housing Projects in Soundview, a
neighborhood in the Bronx, New York, around the time Justice Sotomayor's brother was born. 13

8

See, e.g.,Bullcomingv. New Mexico, 131 ·S. Ct. 2705 (2011);JD.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011);
Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P 'ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011); Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011); Chamber of
Commerce of the US. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011); United States v. Tohono O'Odham Nation, 131 S. Ct.
1723 (2011); Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011); Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (2010); Krupski v.
Costa Crociere S.p.A., 560 U.S. 538 (2010); Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010).
9
Sonia Sotomayor, The Oyez Project at liT Chicago-Kent College of Law, www.oyez.org/justices/sonia_sotomayor
(last visited Nov. 28, 2013).
10
Sotomayor, supra note 4, at 12.
Jd.
/d.
13 ld.
11

12
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In her book, My Beloved World, she described that the move to the Bronxdale Projects
isolated their family. 14 This was due in large part to her father's alcoholism. 15 As a result of her
father's drinking, the family never had visitors, and whenever Justice Sotomayor played with or
had a sleepover with her cousins, it was always away from home. 16 The Sotomayor's developed
a routine where her father would cook dinner every night, and then retire to his bedroom leaving
Sonia and Junior to do their homework until it was time for bed. 17 Justice Sotomayor stated that
her mother's coping mechanism was absenteeism. 18 Celina worked the night shift at a nearby
hospital as a practical nurse, allowing her to avoid being home when her husband was. 19
Justice Sotomayor's father's alcoholism caused a great deal of emotional anguish for her.
She stated, "My father's neglect made me sad, but I intuitively understood that he could not help
, )

~

I"

himself; my mother's neglect made meAat her."20 Her unique ability to understand context clues
and her emotional awareness developed as a result of this situation, as she explained, "However
much was said at home, and loudly, much also went unsaid, and in that atmosphere I was a
watchful child constantly scanning the adults for cues and listening in on their conversations.
My sense of security depended on what information I could glean, any clue dropped
inadvertently when they didn't realize a child was paying attention." 21
Justice Sotomayor's sense of responsibility and independence grew exponentially as a
result of her father's drinking and her mother's absence. One occasion that stuck with Justice
Sotomayor was when her father was sick, and her mother took him to the hospital. Justice
Sotomayor's aunt and uncle came to the Sotomayor's apartment to get the children, and Justice
14

ld.
Jd.
!d.
17 Jd.
18 ld.
19 ld.
20
Jd.
21
Id.
15
16

at 12-13.
at 13.

at 13-14.
at 14.
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Sotomayor overhead them referring to their apartment as a pigsty, and commenting on how there
were dishes in the sink and no toilet paper in the bathroom. 22 Justice Sotomayor, speaking of
that experience, stated, "After that I washed the dishes every night, even the pots and pans, as
soon as we finished dinner. I also dusted the living room once a week. Even though no one ever
came over, the house was always clean. And when I went shopping with Papi on Fridays, I
made sure we bought toilet paper. " 23
An experience that truly evinced Sotomayor's destiny to become a Justice on the
Supreme Court was when she was diagnosed with diabetes. Sotomayor was diagnosed with
diabetes before she turned eight years old. 24 In describing her diagnosis, Justice Sotomayor
stated, "To my family, the disease was a deadly curse. To me, it was more a threat to the already
fragile world of my childhood, a state of constant tension punctuated by explosive discord, all of
it caused by my father's alcoholism and my mother's response to it, whether family fight or
emotional flight. But the disease also inspired in me a kind of precocious self-reliance that is not
uncommon in children who feel the adults around them to be unreliable." 25
Justice Sotomayor's independence and desire to settle conflict thrived through her
diabetes. Justice Sotomayor described awaking one morning to the sound of her parents arguing
about administering Sotomayor's insulin shot. 26 The argument went back and forth between her
mother and father; her father explaining that he was afraid he would hurt Sonia because his
hands were shaking so much; her mother retorting that she had to work to support the family,
explaining she had to do everything and that there would be times when she would not be home

22

ld at 15.
ld
24
Jd at 11.
25 !d.
26
!d. at 3.
23

5

to administer the shots.

27

Justice Sotomayor explained, "The needles hurt, but the screaming was

worse. It made me feel tired, carrying around the weight of their sadness. It was bad enough
when they were fighting about the milk, or the housework, or the money, or the drinking. The
last thing I wanted was for them to fight about me." 28 Justice Sotomayor then came to a
profound realization for a seven year old, as she stated, "It then dawned on me: if I needed to
have these shots every day for the rest of my life, the only way I'd survive was to do it myself." 29
At seven years old, Sonia Sotomayor was not only substantially contributing to her family
through cleaning and shopping, but she was also administering her own insulin shots, which, at
the time, encompassed lighting the gas stove with a match and boiling water in order to sterilize
the needle and syringe. 30 Unknowingly, Sonia Sotomayor had already started her path to the
Supreme Court. At such an early age, she had learned self-discipline, independence, and how to
observe a conflict and artfully resolve it on her own.
Justice Sotomayor would also overcome and persevere through another devastating
experience in her early life that further lead to the development of her independence and
maturity: the death of her father. Sonia Sotomayor was nine when her father passed away. 31 On
that fateful April day, Justice Sotomayor and Junior were walking directly home from school
because their father stayed home sick from work. 32
When the children got home, "I looked into the living room and saw many faces looking
back at me with the same teary gaze. Mami was sitting in the chair by the telephone in the
hallway, staring into space, her eyes wide and wet. Junior said to her, 'Where's Papi?'"33

ld
ld at 3-4.
29
Jd at 3.
30
ld at 4.
31
ld at 40.
32 ld
33
ld at 41.
27
28
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Sotomayor's mother then said, '"Dios se lo llevo."' 34 Justice Sotomayor continued, "God took
him. I could see that Junior didn't understand. I did. She meant that Papi had died. But what
did that mean? I didn't know what I was supposed to feel, or say, or do." 35 Sonia ran down the
hallway and into a bedroom where she began to cry and pound her fists, when Ana came into the
room and told her to be a big girl, and to be strong for her mother. 36 Sotomayor, only nine years
old, was now a diabetic with an alcoholic father who had just died, and she had to be strong for
her mother. Shortly thereafter the Sotomayor's moved into a new apartment in the Bronxdale
Projects because her mother could not go back into the one in which Sonia's father passed. 37
Sonia's mother was also able to change her schedule to enable her to be home when the children
got home from schoo1. 38
Justice Sotomayor's life did not get any easier after the passing of her father, but it was
another opportunity for growth and perseverance. Justice Sotomayor explained, "In the days and
weeks following the funeral, the release and relief I felt from the end of the fighting gave way to
anxious puzzlement. At nine, I was equipped to understand loss, even sadness, but not grief, not
someone else's and certainly not my own. I couldn't figure out what was wrong with Mami, and
it scared me." 39 When Sonia and Junior would come home from school every day, even though
their mother changed her schedule in order to be home, they would find the apartment dark, with
the curtains drawn. 40 Their mother would come out from her bedroom long enough to cook

ld.
ld.
36 ld.
37
I d. at 44.
38 ld.
39
I d. at 46.
40 ld.
34
35
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dinner, to apathetically serve dinner, and retire back to her room, leaving Sonia and Junior to
once again do homework and watch television by their lonesome. 41
After an entire summer of incomprehension of her mother's grief, Sonia and Junior went
back to school. Justice Sotomayor was unable to tolerate her mother's isolation any longer, and
one day upon returning home from school, she expressed her emotion. 42 Sonia pounded with
both hands on her mother's closed door and screamed at her, stating, '"Enough! You've got to
stop this! You're miserable and you're making us miserable ... What's wrong with you? Papi
died. Are you going to die too? Then what happens to me and Junior? Stop already, Mami, stop
it!"' 43 Sonia's mother stood in her room, blank faced, as Sonia then ran into her rom and cried
herself to sleep. 44
Without realizing it, young Justice Sotomayor had saved her family further anguish once
again. The next day, upon returning home from school, the window shades were up and the
radio was playing, and their mother was wearing a dress, makeup, and perfume: Sonia felt relief
throughout her entire body. 45 Reflecting on this experience, Sonia explained that the memories
of her childhood are bifurcated between the claustrophobia of home, and the expansive joy of the
outside world and her family; but the largest contrast was between life before and after her father
died. 46 After Sonia's emotional explosion, home was now a good place to be. 47
Through her mother's self-imposed exile, Sonia's academic prowess would develop.
Justice Sotomayor explained, "My solace and only distraction that summer was reading. I
discovered the pleasure of chapter books and devoured a big stack of them. The Parkchester

Jd.
!d.
43
ld.
44 Jd.
45
!d.
46 ld.
47
ld.
41

42

at 49.
at 50.
at 65.
at 66.
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Library was my haven. To thumb through the card catalog was to touch an infinite bounty, more
books than I could ever possibly exhaust."48 As a result of her incessant summer reading, Sonia
began to thrive at school. 49 Sonia not only improved because of her love for books however, but
also because the Sotomayor's began speaking English at home. 50 The switch to English had a
profound impact on Sonia's academic performance and capabilities, and it instilled the
importance of education in Sonia. 5 1 Sonia's devotion to her own education was inspired by her
mother, as Sonia stated, '"You've got to get your education! It's the only way to get ahead in the
world.' That was her constant refrain, and I could no more get it out of my head than a
commercial I'd heard a thousand times." 52
Fifth grade was an extremely important year for Sonia's intellectual development, as
several highly influential events came to pass. The first was when Sonia's mother had a visitor
one afternoon. Sonia overhead her mother and this man speaking of priceless knowledge with
reasonable monthly payments that give access to as much information as a library of a thousand
books. 53 When the complete twenty-four volume Encyclopedia Britannica was later delivered,
Sotomayor described it as, "Christmas come early." 54 Sonia greatly expanded her intellectual
prowess and developed a thirst for knowledge as a result. 55
Justice Sotomayor had been doing well in school; however she wanted to be one of the
best in the class. 56 In order to accomplish this goal, Justice Sotomayor, in an atypical fashion for
a fifth grader, decided to approach one of the smartest girls in her class and ask her how to

48

Id at 47.
ld at 69.
50 ld
51
ld at 70.
52 ld
49

53
54

55
56

Jd
Jd

I d at 70-71.
ld .
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study.

57

Through the ensuing conversation, Sotomayor learned to underline important facts and

take notes while reading to condense information into smaller bits that were easy to remember,
and to reread those notes before a test. 58 Justice Sotomayor stated that, the more important
lesson she had learned through that exchange was, "Don't be shy about making a teacher of any
willing party who knows what he or she is doing." 59 Even at an early age, Justice Sotomayor
was beginning to develop a pattern that would stick with her throughout the remainder of her
education and her professional life: seeking out a mentor, asking guidance, and soaking up
whatever information she could. 60

B. Choosing a Career
Justice Sotomayor's destiny to be a Supreme Court Justice further revealed itself at the
astonishing age of ten. While sitting in the waiting room at Albert Einstein College of Medicine
where she received tests for her diabetes, she read a pamphlet about choosing a profession suited
for diabetics. 61 The pamphlet listed many possibilities: a doctor, a lawyer, an architect, an
engineer, a nurse, and a teacher. 62 The pamphlet then contained a list of professions that were
unsuited for a person with diabetes, and among this list was a police officer. 63 This devastated
Sotomayor, as she had aspirations of becoming a detective, just like those she read about in her
Nancy Drew books. 64
While contemplating that pamphlet, young Justice Sotomayor realized that her solution
was available on the television series, Perry Mason. 65 Every Thursday night, Justice Sotomayor

57

ld. at 72.
ld.
59 ld.
60 Jd.
61
ld. at 79.
62 ld.
63 ld.
64 ld.
65
ld. at 80.
58
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sat, watching intently as Perry Mason solved his cases and proved his clients' innocence. 66
While being enamored with Perry Mason, Justice Sotomayor's unwavering goal of finding the
truth reared its head, as she was more sympathetic to Burger, the prosecutor. 67 Burger was more
committed to finding the truth than to winning his cases, and when Burger explained that if the
defendant was truly innocent and the case was dismissed, he had done his job, because justice
had been served. 68 With that being said however, it was the judge who truly captured
Sotomayor's attention. 69 Justice Sotomayor knew that the end of the episode was the most
important, because that was when the judge made his decision on whether or not to dismiss the
charges. 70 Ten year old Sonia Sotomayor, a girl whose decisiveness had already saved her
family from confrontations and further fighting, knew she could be a great lawyer, and wanted to
be ajudge. 71

C. Justice Sotomayor's Education
Once enrolled in Cardinal Spellman High School, Justice Sotomayor's intellectual
horizons expanded with the influence of a history teacher, Miss Katz. Miss Katz taught Justice
Sotomayor to think abstractly and conceptually, rather than just memorizing facts. 72 This skill
was very important to Justice Sotomayor's development as an excellent student, and later, an
excellent attorney and judge. Sonia learned how to analyze facts and how to think critically
about history. 73
Signing up for the Forensics Club at Cardinal Spellman also played an important role in
Justice Sotomayor's development as an excellent examiner of facts. As evidence of Justice
Id
Id
68
Id at 80-81.
69 ld
70
Id at 81.
7t Id
72
!d. at 104.
73 Id
66
67
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Sotomayor's ever persistent self-awareness, she joined the Forensics Club as part of her selfimposed program in public speaking because the Forensics Club was a debate team. 74 Justice
Sotomayor's friend, Kenny Moy, was the student coach of the girl's team of the Forensics Club,
and Justice Sotomayor learned from Kenny how to dismantle an opponent's position step by
step, how to argue affirmatively and persuasively, and how to be unfazed by emotion.

75

Justice

Sotomayor explained, "Forensics Club was good training for a lawyer in ways that I barely
understood at the time. You got handed a topic, as well as the side you had to argue, pro or con.
It didn't matter what you believed about the issue; what mattered was how well you argued. You

not only had to see both sides; you had to prepare as if you were arguing both in order to
anticipate your opponent's moves." 76
Justice Sotomayor had reached the finals of a speech competition, and her presentation
offers insights to not only how well suited she was to be a lawyer and a judge, but also her view
on crime and witnesses. 77 Justice Sotomayor selected the cold-blooded murder of Kitty
Genovese in Queens, and the neighbors who witnessed it but did nothing as her topic for her
final presentation. 78 Justice Sotomayor ascended the podium and began to tell the story of Kitty
Genovese; a young woman who drove home from her job as a bartender and was savagely
stabbed, beaten, and raped. 79 Justice Sotomayor, noticing the audiences undivided attention,
continued; thirty-eight people in their homes witnessed the assault that lasted a half hour,
however only one person called the police after it ended, when it was already too late. 80 Justice
Sotomayor explained that the assailant was later caught and is serving life in prison, but she was

74

Id.
I d.
76
I d.
77
Id.
75

78
79

at
at
at
at

109.
109-1 0.
11 0-11.
111.

Id.

Id. at 112.
80 Id.
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concerned with the witnesses, who sat idly by while this young woman was being raped and
murdered. 81 In her presentation, Justice Sotomayor explained,"' A crime like what happened to
Kitty Genovese may be the act of a deranged individual. Other crimes may be different in their
causes, pointing to broader failures of society. But in the moment of opportunity, when a
criminal grabs his chance and a victim is suffering, our own responsibility is the same. When the
criminal finds his victim in a dark alley, an observer too has a moment of opportunity. "'

82

Justice Sotomayor then challenged her audience, "'Will you see the victim not as a
stranger or a statistic but as another human being like yourself? Will you be fully human in that
moment and feel the obligation to care, to act, to get involved? Will you be fully a citizen and
rise to the responsibility?"' 83 This exchange offers invaluable insight into Justice Sotomayor's
early capability to capture an audience, and to orate persuasively and argumentatively.
Notwithstanding Justice Sotomayor's strong self-awareness and career aspirations, it took
her friend Kenny Moy to begin her thinking about college. Kenny Moy, who was enrolled in his
freshman year at Princeton University, called Sotomayor, and one statement Kenny made stuck
with her because she had no idea what it meant: he said to try for the Ivy League.

84

Justice

Sotomayor jotted down the names of the schools that Kenny rattled off, and when she informed
her guidance counsellor at school of her aspirations, the guidance counsellor offered no help. 85
Justice Sotomayor applied to the Ivy League schools that Kenny had recommended all on her
own, and soon enough, a postcard from Princeton University arrived. 86 The post card contained
three boxes, with "likely," "possible," and "unlikely," next to each. 87 Justice Sotomayor's post

ld
Id at
83 ld
84
Jd at
85
ld at
86
Id at
87 Id
81

82

113.
116-17.
117.
118.

13

card was marked "likely. " 88 Justice Sotomayor, in a visit with a stunned guidance counsellor,
had just learned that it was very likely she was going to be accepted to Princeton. 89
An experience that would prove to be influential and motivational then happened to
Justice Sotomayor: her first experience with affirmative action. As she was still trying to wrap
her head around the prospect of being admitted to Princeton, the school nurse stopped Justice
Sotomayor in the hallway. 90 The school nurse wanted to know how Justice Sotomayor got a
"likely" from Princeton, when two top ranking girls in the school only received a "possible."91
Justice Sotomayor stated, "Her question would hang over me not just that day but for the next
several years, while I lived the day-to-day reality of affirmative action." 92 Justice Sotomayor did
not understand affirmative action, as it was a mere decade old. 93 However, the question that the
nurse asked of her just pushed her to prove herself even more. After visiting Radcliffe, Yale, and
Princeton, Justice Sotomayor decided to attend Princeton. 94
While Justice Sotomayor ultimately thrived at Princeton, graduating summa cum laude,
her determination and diligence proved itself after she received her first grade. Justice
Sotomayor received a Con the first assignment she handed in at Princeton. 95 Justice Sotomayor
was crushed, and did not understand where she had gone wrong. 96 The Professor gave Justice
Sotomayor all too familiar advice; her paper was full of information and facts, however, there
was no argumentative structure, and no thesis that her facts were organized to support. 97 This
was discouraging to Justice Sotomayor, and she did not know if she would ever master how to
Jd.
ld.
90 ld.
91
ld.
92 ld.
93 ld.
94
Jd.
95
ld.
96 ld.
97
ld.
88

89

at 119.

at 123.
at 133.
at 133-34.
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write argumentatively, but, in another moment of indelible self-awareness, she realized that all
she had to do was to transfer her debate skills onto paper. 98 Justice Sotomayor realized that she
needed to map out a position, anticipate and address objections, and consider how best to
persuade her audience. 99 This simple realization is still present in the opinions she writes for the
Supreme Court; efficiently and effectively organized into a well-mapped out argument,
specifically tailored to addressing the weaknesses in her position.
While the quality of her writing and her grades improved, Justice Sotomayor still had to
solve her general deficiency in written English. 100 Justice Sotomayor's American History
Professor pointed out that her sentences were fragments, her tenses were erratic, and her
grammar was often incorrect. 101 Justice Sotomayor realized that this was, in part, due to the fact
that she wrote English using Spanish constructions and usage. 102 Once again, evincing her work
ethic, desire to be competitive, and her unending desire to better herself, Justice Sotomayor
bought grammar and vocabulary handbooks, and during the summers would devote her lunch
hour at work to doing grammar exercises and learning ten new words. 103
Another challenge that Justice Sotomayor would overcome at Princeton was the selfconsciousness that came along with the gaps in knowledge and understanding as a result of the
limits of class and cultural background. 104 Princeton was a drastic change to Justice Sotomayor's
life, as she had been geographic and cultural experiences had been limited almost exclusively to
the Bronx. 105 For the first time, Justice Sotomayor was also exposed to the wide disparity of
wealth at Princeton. Justice Sotomayor's mother's income never reached above five thousand
!d.
!d.
100 !d.
101 !d.
102 !d.
103
!d. at 135.
104 !d.
105 !d.

98

99
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dollars a year, and now, through her work study program, she was exposed to the financial
figures of the wealthiest students at Princeton and how they paid for tuition. 106 Justice
Sotomayor stated that after seeing those numbers she squarely knew where she stood in relation
to some of the people among whom she was living and learning. 107
Justice Sotomayor's persistence eventually paid off at Princeton, as she is the living
epitome of the saying, "Hard work pays off." When Justice Sotomayor was a senior, she
received a letter in the mail that she quickly disregarded and threw in the garbage. 108 The letter
was from Phi Beta Kappa, a national honor society that Justice Sotomayor wrote off as a scam. 109
It took a snooping friend of Justice Sotomayor's to convince her that it was a prestigious honor

that she had to accept. 110 Another such occasion occurred when the dean of student affairs called
Justice Sotomayor to inform her that she had won and would be receiving the Pyne Prize. 111
Justice Sotomayor expressed her gratitude, but ultimately thought the dean of student affairs was
overreacting in her congratulatory tone. 112 Justice Sotomayor called the same friend that had
informed her of the prestige of Phi Beta Kappa, who explained to her that the award was the
highest honor that a graduating senior at Princeton could receive, and obligated her to give a
speech at an alumni luncheon. 113
One last surprise would come for Justice Sotomayor at Princeton that she did not
understand upon hearing the news. As Justice Sotomayor described, "Graduation brought one
last unfamiliar laurel when Peter Winn called me into his office to tell me that I would graduate
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summa cum laude." 114 When Justice Sotomayor looked up the meaning of summa cum laude,
not only was the irony not lost on her, however it was a moment of reflection. Justice Sotomayor
stated, "It was perhaps then I made a measure of peace with my unease; the uncertainty I'd
always felt at Princeton was something I'd never shake entirely. For all the As and honors that
could be bestowed, there would still lurk such moments of estrangement to remind me that my
being there was not typical but an exception." 115 Justice Sotomayor's time at Princeton was
finished, and she had more than proven herself as being worthy of its education.
Justice Sotomayor enrolled in Yale Law School the fall after graduating from
Princeton. 116 At Yale Law School, Justice Sotomayor would develop another mentor-mentee
relationship that would profoundly influence her life. Notwithstanding the previous guiding
forces in Justice Sotomayor's life, she described Jose Cabranes as her first true mentor.

117

Justice Sotomayor described, "I had not yet discovered the benefit of sustained dialogue with
someone who epitomized the kind of achievement I aspired to, and much beyond that. It was not
the comfort ofhandholding; rather, it was a style of learning by means of engaging a living
example." 118 Justice Sotomayor learned from observing Jose Cabranes and the nuances and
complexity of live action. 119 Justice Sotomayor described him as, "[T]he complete package of
knowledge, experience, and judgment." 120
Justice Sotomayor worked for Jose Cabranes as his research assistant, researching the
legislative history of U.S . citizenship for Puerto Ricans. 121 Sotomayor described she truly
learned from observing Cabranes' behavior with people, and his knowledge of the law, history,
114
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and his ability to warmly engage people in conversation.

122

Cabranes taught Justice Sotomayor

many of the skills that would propel her to the Supreme Court. Sotomayor learned how to be a
"citizen-lawyer," through maintaining community relationships while retaining self-assurance
and grace. 123 Justice Sotomayor modeled her legal career after the example set by Jose
Cabranes, and emphasized, "[A] role model in the flesh provides more than an inspiration; his or
her very existence is confirmation of possibilities one may have every reason to doubt, saying,
'Yes, someone like me can do this.' By the time I got to Yale, I had met a few successful
lawyers, usually in their role as professors. Jose, the first I had the chance to observe up close,
not only transcended the academic role but also managed to uphold his identity as a Puerto
Rican, serving vigorously in both worlds." 124 These lessons have persevered in Justice
Sotomayor's career, and she has become. an exemplary model of how to become successful while
staying true to one's roots.
Another experience that would stick with Justice Sotomayor and impact her career was
her summer associate position with the law firm Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison. 125
Justice Sotomayor struggled in this position, as she was assigned to contribute to a large brief
being prepared for an antitrust case. 126 Justice Sotomayor stated that she knew her writing was
subpar, but it was confirmed when her work was not included in what the associate she was
working under prepared and passed on to the next level. 127 At the end of the summer, Justice
Sotomayor was not offered a position with the firm, which shook Justice Sotomayor. 128 She was
concerned that she was not yet thinking like a lawyer, and that the hard work she had put in was
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not enough.

129

Once again, Justice Sotomayor viewed her writing as her weakness; an inability

to persuasively advocate. 130 In pure Justice Sotomayor fashion however, she faced the challenge
head on, and broke the problem up into smaller parts that were easier to tackle in a methodical
fashion. 131 This same methodical analysis and her ability to break down a problem have stuck
with her, and are evident in every judicial opinion, concurrence, or dissent that Justice
Sotomayor pens. Justice Sotomayor, even though she eventually overcame this obstacle, stated,
"The memory of this trauma, which I was determined not to repeat, while not suffocating my
ambitions, would overhang my every career choice until I became ajudge." 132
Notwithstanding Justice Sotomayor's success at Princeton and at Yale Law School,
people still doubted her and attributed her success to affirmative action. One such occasion that
would stick with Justice Sotomayor was a dinner party hosted by the law firm Shaw, Pittman,
Potts & Throwbridge. 133 Justice Sotomayor met the partner who held the event, and they
immediately engaged in a discussion about affirmative action. 134 The partner asked Justice
Sotomayor if she believed in affirmative action, and if Yale and Princeton had an affirmative
action program. 135 He then asked Justice Sotomayor, '"Do you believe law firms should practice
affirmative action? Don't you think it's a disservice to minorities, hiring them without the
necessary credentials, knowing you'll have to fire them a few years later?"' 136 Justice
Sotomayor was taken aback by this question, and responded by stating that she thought even
someone who got admitted by affirmative action could prove they were qualified by their
subsequent accomplishments; to which the Partner from Shaw, Pittman responded that was the
129
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problem with affirmative action, and proceeded to ask Justice Sotomayor if she thought she
would have been admitted to Yale Law School if she was not Puerto Rican. 137
Justice Sotomayor decided to go ahead with the formal recruiting process the following
day, and had an interview with the partner from the night before. 138 Sotomayor went to the
interview, and before she knew what was happening, the partner encouraged her to travel to
Washington for the next step in the formal hiring process. 139 Justice Sotomayor, however,
instead of accepting the invitation, challenged the partner on the preceding evening. 140 She
confronted his insulting manner of speaking to her, and about his views of affirmative action.

141

This is a great example of Justice Sotomayor's eagerness to stand up for herself and what she
believes in, while doing so cordially and respectfully.
As a result of this exchange, Justice Sotomayor came to a realization about affirmative
action. She stated, "When the anger, the upset, and the agitation had passed, a certainty
remained: I had no need to apologize that the look-wider, search-more affirmative action that
Princeton and Yale practiced had opened doors for me. That was its purpose: to create the
conditions whereby students from disadvantaged backgrounds could be brought to the starting
line of a race many were unaware was even being run." 142 Justice Sotomayor was starting to
make peace with her affirmative action beginnings, and knew that she proved herself through her
relentless hard work. 143 Affirmative action itself and its role in society has changed, but as
Justice Sotomayor sta~ed, "But one thing has not changed: to doubt the worth of minority
students' achievements when they succeed is really only to present another face of the prejudice

137

ld at 189.
Id
139 ld
14o Id
141
Id at 190.
142
Id at 191.
143 Id
138

20

that would deny them a chance even to try. It is the same prejudice that insists all those destined
for success must be cast from the same mold as those who have succeeded before them, a view
that experience has already proven a fallacy." 144 Justice Sotomayor is a living example of that
fallacy.
One day at Yale, a desire for cheddar cheese cubes would dramatically affect Justice
Sotomayor's career path. Justice Sotomayor, taking a break from studying one evening, passed
the open door of a conference room where she observed a table of cheese, crackers, and cheap
wine. 145 Inside the conference room was a panel on public service career paths. 146 The last
speaker was a district attorney from New York who promised to be brief, so she decided to stay
in order to reap the benefits of the cheese table. 147 When the district attorney began to speak, he
immediately captured Justice Sotomayor's attention, as he stated that within the first year of
employment with the district attorney, the new assistant's would be going to trial, with full
responsibility for how they would develop and present their cases. 148 After the district attorney
was done speaking, Justice Sotomayor lined up to speak to him, and their conversation led to a
meeting the next day. 149 During this meeting, Justice Sotomayor was thoroughly impressed by
what the district attorney was saying, and Perry Mason popped into her head. 150 Justice
Sotomayor stated, "Perhaps Bob Morgenthau's job stirred a memory of what had first intrigued
me about being a lawyer: the chance to seek justice in a courtroom. Despite my success in the
trial advocacy program and reaching the semifinals of the Barrister's Union mock trials, Perry
Mason was a vision that had been eclipsed at Yale amid the immersion in case law and theory
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and self-doubt. Now, it seemed that untold fantasy was beckoning me again, conspiring with a
bit of free cheddar to decide my fate." 151 Just like that, Justice Sotomayor accepted a position
with the district attorney's office in New York, and began her climb to the Supreme Court of the
United States.

III.

Opinions, Concurrences, and Dissents on the Supreme Court of the United States
Justice Sotomayor has a distinctive style of legal writing. She employs a no-nonsense,

common sense approach to legal writing in which she engages in broad research of the relevant
law, precedent, statutory history, and factual details in order to reach a narrow conclusion.
Utilizing the same techniques she developed at an early age, Justice Sotomayor breaks down the
issue into smaller problems and methodically works her way through it to reach a well thought
out conclusion, applying the law to the facts in a narrow, yet commonsense fashion. Justice
Sotomayor's legal opinions all follow a similar overall structure: a thorough analysis of the facts
of the case, a description of the case's procedural posture, an in-depth and technical explanation
of the current law, an acknowledgment of the opposition's stance, an often narrow,
commonsense application of the law to the facts, and a conclusion. The following cases were
selected as they are excellent examples of Justice Sotomayor's technical, incremental, and
exhaustive application of the law to the facts in front of her.
A. Majority Opinions
1. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011)

This case, exemplifies Justice Sotomayor's commonsense approach to the application of
law to the specific facts presented to her. The issue in this case is whether or not the age of a
child subjected to police questioning is relevant to the custody analysis identified in Miranda v.
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Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 152 Justice Sotomayor, in writing for the majority, held that, so
long as the child's age was known to the police officer at the time of police questioning, or
would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, its inclusion in the custody
analysis is proper. 153
J.D.B. was a thirteen year old, seventh grade student attending class at Smith Middle
School in Chapel Hill, North Carolina when he was removed from class by a uniformed police
officer, taken to a conference room, and questioned. 154 J.D.B was being questioned because he
was seen behind a residence in a neighborhood where two home break-ins had occurred, and he
was seen at school possessing a digital camera that was stolen from one of those homes. 155 A
police investigator, Investigator DiCostanzo, was assigned to the case and went to J.D.B.'s
school to question him. 156 Investigator DiCostanzo instructed the school resource officer to
remove J.D.B. from class and to take him to a conference room. 157 J.D.B. was then questioned
by Investigator DiCostanzo in the presence of the school resource officer, the assistant principal,
and the administrative intern about the home break-ins, without ever receiving Miranda
warnings, without being given a chance to speak with his legal guardian (his grandmother), and
without being informed that he could terminate the questioning and leave at any time. 158
Upon questioning, J.D.B. originally denied any wrongdoing, stating that he was in the
neighborhood seeking work mowing lawns. 159 The assistant principal then urged J.D.B. to "do
the right thing," because, "the truth always comes out in the end." 160 Eventually, J.D.B. asked
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Investigator DiCostanzo if he would "still be in trouble" if he returned the "stuff." 161
Investigator DiCostanzo then explained to J.D.B. that the return of the stolen goods would bode
well for J.D.B., however, the case was going to be litigated regardless. 162 DiCostanzo then
warned J.D.B. that he may have to go to juvenile detention before court if DiCostanzo believed
that J.D.B would continue to break into other homes. 163 After learning this information, J.D.B.
confessed to the home break-ins and only then was J.D.B. told that he could refuse to answer the
Investigator's answers, and that he was free to leave. 164 J.D.B. then wrote a statement, and at the
end of the school day he was allowed to get on the bus and go home. 165
J.D.B. was charged with two counts of breaking and entering and larceny in the juvenile
petitions filed against him. 166 The public defender moved to suppress the statements J.D.B. had
made to Investigator DiCostanzo, arguing that J.D.B. had been interrogated by police in a
custodial setting without being read his Miranda rights. 167 The trial court denied the motion,
determining that J.D.B. was not in custody at the time of the interrogation, and that his
statements were voluntary. 168 J.D.B. appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals, which
affirmed, holding that J.D.B. was not in custody when he confessed and declining to consider the
age of the individual subjected to questioning by police. 169
Justice Sotomayor then began her incremental, methodical breakdown of the relevant law
and precedent to which she would make her decision. Justice Sotomayor stated, "Any police
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interview of an individual suspected of a crime has 'coercive aspects to it. "' 170 Justice
Sotomayor noted, however, that only police interrogations that occur in custody present the
heightened risk that the statements obtained from a suspect are not the product of free will. 171
Justice Sotomayor pointed out that custodial interrogation entails inherently compelling
pressures, and that even for an adult, the physical and psychological isolation of custodial
interrogation can undermine the individual's will to resist and compel speech where he or she
would not do so otherwise. 172 As a result of custodial interrogation by police, many people
confess to crimes they did not commit, and Justice Sotomayor explained that this risk is all the
more present and troubling when the subject of custodial interrogation is a child. 173
The Court then explained that, in response to this inherently coercive environment, it
adopted Miranda in order to safeguard the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination.

174

As a result, prior to questioning, a suspect must be informed that he or she has the right to remain
silent, that any statement he or she does make may be used against him or her in a court of law,
and that he or she has the right to an attorney, whether retained or appointed. 175 Miranda further
placed the burden on the government to establish that, if a suspect does make a statement, he or
she did so knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. 176
Justice Sotomayor then described the necessity of determining whether the suspect was in
custody in order to determine if he or she was entitled to his or her Miranda rights. She stated,
"Because these measures protect the individual against the coercive nature of custodial
interrogation, they are required 'only where there had been such a restriction on a person's
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freedom as to render him in custody."' 177 Justice Sotomayor then stated the test for determining
whether a suspect is in custody is twofold: what were the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation, and given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was
at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. 178 The objective nature of the test means that
the subjective views of the interrogating officer or the person being questioned are irrelevant in
the custody analysis. 179 The objective nature of the inquiry is meant to give police clear
guidance as to when Miranda warning are required. 180 Because police need to make split second
decisions regarding whether or not to read a suspect his or her Miranda rights, limiting the
analysis to the objective circumstances of the interrogation, and asking how a reasonable person
in the suspect's position would understand his freedom to terminate questioning and leave, the
objective test avoids burdening police with the task of making a subjective state of mind inquiry
with every suspect. 181

~otomayor
then begari to apply Miranda and its progeny regarding the custody
...
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analysis to J.D.B.'s situation. Justice Sotomayor began by stating:
The state and amici contend that a child's age has no place in the
custody analysis no matter how young the child subjected to police
questioning. We cannot agree. In some circumstances, a child's
age 'would have affected how a reasonable person' in the suspect's
position 'would perceive his or her freedom to leave. That is, a
reasonable child subject to police questioning will sometimes feel
pressured to submit when a reasonable adult would feel free to
go.I82

Justice Sotomayor reasoned that the Court believed that courts can account for the reality that
children think, act, and are influenced differently than adults, without damaging the objective
177
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nature of the custody analysis. 183 Justice Sotomayor then pointed to the commonsense notion
that a child's age is more than a chronological fact: it is a fact that generates commonsense
conclusions about behavior and perception. 184 Justice Sotomayor continued, "Such conclusions
apply broadly to children as a class. And, they are self-evident to anyone who was a child once
himself, including any police officer or judge." 185
Justice Sotomayor then pointed to the court's own history to demonstrate her point that
the law treats children differently. She stated that the Court has observed that children are less
mature and responsible than adults, that they often lack the experience, perspective, and
judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them, and that they are
more vulnerable to outside pressures than adults. 186 Justice Sotomayor further pointed out that
the Court, in Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948), stated that events that would leave a man
in police interrogation cold and unimpressed could overcome, overawe, and overwhelm a
child. 187
Justice Sotomayor then pointed out that a multitude of other areas of the law recognize
children's' limited capacity to make decisions and understand the world around them. 188 She
described how the universal differentiating characteristics of children are universal, pointing to
the limitations on children's ability to alienate property, enter a binding contract, and marry
without parent consent. 189 More Strikingly, Justice Sotomayor pointed out that, "[E]ven where a
'reasonable person' standard otherwise applies, the common law has reflect the reality that
.......~

children are not adults. In negligence suits, for instances, where liability turns on what an
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objectively reasonable person would do in the circumstances, '[a]ll American jurisdictions accept
the idea that a person's childhood is a relevant circumstance' to be considered." 190 Accordingly,
recognizing that there is an abundance of legal precedent that does not treat children as miniature
adults, Justice Sotomayor announced her standard, "So long as the child's age was known to the
officer at the time of the interview, or would have been objectively apparent to any reasonable
officer, including age as part of the custody analysis requires officers neither to consider
circumstances unknown to them, nor to anticipate the frailties or idiosyncrasies of the particular
suspect whom they question." 191
Justice Sotomayor's application of the law governing Miranda's custody determination
of children is commonsense, because childhood and age yields objective conclusions similar to
those identified in this opinion, and considering age in the custody analysis does not involve a
determination of how a child's age subjectively affects the mindset of a particular child. 192
Justice Sotomayor provided that this case was a prime example of how an application of the
custody analysis without considering age as a factor would lead to absurd results. Justice
Sotomayor stated:
Were the court precluded from taking J.D.B. 's youth into account,
it would be forced to evaluate the circumstances present here
through the eyes of a reasonable person of average years. In other
words, how would a reasonable adult understand his situation, after
being removed from a seventh-grade social studies class by a
uniformed school resource officer; being encouraged by his
assistant principal to 'do the right thing'; and being warned by a
police investigator of the prospect of juvenile detention and
separation from his guardian and primary caretaker? To describe
such an inquiry is to demonstrate its absurdity. Neither officers
nor courts can reasonably evaluate the effect of objective
circumstances that, by their nature, are specific to children without
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accounting for the age of the child subjected to those
circumstances. 193
As Justice Sotomayor pointed out, deciding whether a child's age influenced whether or not he
or she felt free to terminate an interrogation and leave does not involve a detailed subjective
inquiry into each child's state ofmind. 194 Accordingly, Justice Sotomayor held that so long as
the child's age was known to the officer at the time of police questioning, or would have been
objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, its inclusion in the custody analysis is consistent
with the objective nature of that test. 195
This case demonstrates Justice Sotomayor's commonsense approach to the application of
law to a specific set of facts. While some of her colleagues dissented, believing that the Court's
decision cannot be reconciled with Miranda 's attempt at establishing a clear rule that can be
applied in all cases, this case is a demonstration that strict adherence to a precedent can lead to
absurd results, if not for the application of commonsense. Justice Sotomayor, in determining that
it is proper to account for a child's age in Miranda's objective custody test, applied
commonsense to existing precedent in order to reach a logical, well-rounded conclusion.
2. Dillon v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2683 (2010)
This case presented the Court with the question of whether its decision in United States v.

Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), which rendered the Sentencing Guidelines promulgated by
Congress as advisory, requires reading the Sentencing Guidelines as nonbinding.

196

Justice

Sotomayor, writing for the majority, held that, given the limited scope and purpose of the statute
at issue, the proceedings at issue under that section do not implicate the interests identified in
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Booker, and that the sentencing modification proceedings authorized by the statute are not
constitutionally compelled. 197
In 1993, Percy Dillon was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to distribute and to possess
with the intent to distribute more than 500 grams of powder cocaine and more than 50 grams of
crack cocaine in violation of21 U.S.C. § 846, possession with the intent to distribute more than
500 grams of powder cocaine in violation of§ 841(a)(1), and use of a firearm during and in
relation to a drug trafficking offense. 198 These convictions exposed Dillon to ten years to life
imprisonment for the conspiracy charges, five to forty years imprisonment for the cocaine
possession, and a mandatory minimum sentence of 5 years for the firearm offense to be served
consecutively to the sentence for the drug offenses. 199
While being sentenced, the District Court found that Dillon was responsible 1.5
kilograms of crack cocaine and 1.6 kilograms of powder cocaine. 200 These offenses, coupled
with other agitating and mitigating factors exposed Dillon to a mandatory sentence range of two
hundred sixty two to three hundred twenty seven months imprisonment. 201 The Court sentenced
Dillon at the bottom of the Guidelines range, followed by a mandatory sixty month sentence for
the firearm count, for a total sentence of three hundred twenty two months? 02 At sentencing, the
District Court explained that it viewed the length of the term to be entirely too high for the crime
committed, but was constrained to impose the sentence the Guidelines set out.

203

Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Dillon's conviction and sentence on appeal.
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204

The Third

Justice Sotomayor began her majority opinion describing the statutory history of the 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c), the statute at issue in this case. Justice Sotomayor stated that, under§ 3582(c),
a federal court generally may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed.205
However, Congress enacted§ 3582(c)(2), which states that, in the case of a defendant who has
been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently
been lowered by the Sentencing Commission, a court may reduce the sentence if it is consistent
with applicable Commission policy statements. 206 The policy statement that proceeds §
3582(c)(2) instructs courts not to reduce a term of imprisonment below the minimum number of
an amended sentencing range except to the extent the original term of imprisonment was below
the range then acceptable. 207
Justice Sotomayor explained that the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 established the
Sentencing Commission and authorized it to promulgate Sentencing Guidelines and to issue
(----·

~-.

po~~-e ~tJtements regarding the Guidelines' application. 208 Under the Act, the Commission must
periodically review and revise the Guidelines and determine under what circumstances and by
what amount the sentences for certain offenses can be reduced? 09 Justice Sotomayor stated that,
as enacted, the Act made the Sentencing Guidelines binding, and that except in limited
circumstances, district courts lacked discretion to depart from the Guidelines. 210 Justice
Sotomayor stated, "Under that regime, facts found by a judge by a preponderance of the
evidence often increased the mandatory Guidelines

ran~d permitted the judge to impose a

sentence greater than that supported by the facts established by the jury verdict or guilty plea.
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We held in Booker that treating the Guidelines as mandatory in these circumstances violated the
Sixth Amendment right of criminal defendants to be tried by a jury and to have every element of
an offense proved by the Government beyond a reasonable doubt." 211
In order to remedy that constitutional problem, the Court rendered the Guidelines
advisory by invalidating two provisions of the Act: § 3553(b)(1), which required a sentencing
court to impose a sentence within the applicable Guidelines range, and§ 3742(e), which
prescribed the standard of review on appeal, including de novo review of Guidelines
departures. 212 The Court concluded that, with those two sections excised, the rest of the Act
satisfied the constitution. Justice Sotomayor then stated that Booker thus left intact other
provisions of the Act, including those giving the Commission authority to revise the Guidelines
and to determine when and to what extent a revision would be retroactive? 13
The Sentencing Guidelines, with respect to drug trafficking offenses, establish a
defendant's base offense level by the type and weight of the drug. 214 The Sentencing
Commission amended the Guidelines in 2007 to reduce by two levels the base offense level
associated with each quantity of crack cocaine, and in 2008 the Commission made the revision
retroactive. 215 According to the Act, when the Commission makes a Guidelines amendment
retroactive,§ 3582(c)(2) authorizes a district court to reduce an otherwise final sentence that is
based on the amended provision, and any reduction must be consistent with applicable policy
statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. 216 The relevant policy statement to drug
trafficking offenses is USSG § 1B 1.1 0, which instructs courts proceeding under § 3582(c)(2) to
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substitute the amended Guidelines range while leaving intact all other Guidelines application
decisions.

217

Justice Sotomayor then stated, that, "Under§ 3582(c)(2), a court may then grant a

reduction within the amended Guidelines range if it determines that one is warranted 'after
considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent they are applicable.' Except in
limited circumstances, however,§ 1B1.10(b)(2)(A) forecloses a court acting under§ 3582(c)(2)
from reducing a sentence 'to a term that is less than the minimum of the amended guidelines
ranges. "'218
Percy Dillon filed a pro se motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to § 3582(c)(2) after
learning that the Sentencing Commission made an amendment to the crack cocaine Guidelines
retroactive. 219 Dillon asked the District Court to reduce his sentence further than the two level
reduction authorized by the amendment. 220 Dillon argued that the Court should reduce his
sentence pursuant to the sentencing factors found in§ 3553(a), specifically based on his postconviction pursuit of educational and community outreach opportunities. 221 Such factors, Dillon
argued, justified the Court in varying from the Guidelines? 22 Dillon further argued that the
Court's decision in Booker authorized courts to grant such a variance because the amended
Guidelines range was advisory, notwithstanding any contrary statement § 1B 1.1 0 in the
Commission's policy statements.
The District Court reduced Dillon's sentence to two hundred seventy months, but
declined to go further, concluding that Booker was not binding and accordingly holding that it
lacked authority to impose a sentence inconsistent with § 1B 1.1 0' s two level reduction. 223 The
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Third Circuit affirmed the District Court, stating that§ 3582(c)(2) is codified in a different
section than the provisions invalidated in Booker and contains no cross-reference to those
provisions. 224 The Third Circuit concluded that the District Court was correct in holding it
lacked authority to reduce Dillon's sentence below the amended Guidelines range, stating
Booker did not obviate Congress' directive in§ 3582(c)(2) that a sentence reduction should be
consistent with the Sentencing Commission's policy statements.

225

Dillon argued that Booker should preclude the Commission from issuing a policy
statement that generally forecloses below Guidelines sentences at§ 3582(c)(2) proceedings,
which§ lBl.lO does. 226 Dillon thus argued that the mandatory language in the Commission's
policy statement in§ 1Bl.lO(b)(2)(A) should be excised, and treated as advisory, just as the
provisions deemed unconstitutional in Booker.
Justice Sotomayor, writing for the majority, stated that the language of§ 3582(c)(2)
foreclosed Dillon's argument, because it speaks of sentence modification by giving courts the
power to reduce an otherwise final sentence in circumstances specified by the Commission, and
not a sentencing or resentencing proceeding like the one outlawed in Booker. 227 Justice
Sotomayor pointed out that, "It is also notable that the provision applies only to a limited class of
prisoners- namely those whose sentence was based on a sentencing range subsequently lowered
by the Commission. Section 3582(c)(2)'s text, together with its narrow scope, shows that
Congress intended to authorize only a limited adjustment to an otherwise final sentence and not a
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plenary resentencing proceeding. " 228 As a result, the sentence modification for crack cocaine
offenses did not implicate defendants' Sixth Amendment rights.
Justice Sotomayor also stated that the substantial role that Congress gave the Commission
in sentence modification proceedings further supports that conclusion. 229 The Act gives the
Commission the authority to decide whether to amend the Guidelines and to decide whether to
make the amendments retroactive. 230 Accordingly, a court's power under§ 3582(c)(2) depends
on the Commission's decision not just to amend the Guidelines but to make the amendment
retroactive. 231 Courts are further constrained by the Commission's policy statements dictating by
what amount the sentence affected by the amendment may be reduced. 232 Further,§ 3582(c)(2)
instructs a district court to consider the sentencing factors set out in§ 3553(a) only to the extent
applicable, but it authorizes a reduction only on the basis that the reduction is consistent with the
applicable policy statements issued by the Commission, which, in this case is§ 1Bl.10?33
Accordingly, a court must first determine that a reduction is consistent with § 1B 1.10 before it
can consider whether a sentence reduction is warranted according to the factors set out in §
3553(a). 234 As a result, a district court does not have the authority to issue a new sentence in the
usual sense, but only a sentence modification consistent with the Commission's instructions set
out in§ 1B1.10. 235 Furthermore, Justice Sotomayor pointed out that the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure requires a defendant be present at sentencing, but excludes from that
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requirement proceedings that involve the correction or reduction of a sentence under Rule 35 or
18 U.S.C. 3582(c)?36
As a result of the foregoing, Justice Sotomayor found that proceedings under §
3582(c)(2) do not implicate the interests identified in Booker? 37 Justice Sotomayor pointed out
that the sentence modification proceedings at issue are not constitutionally compelled, and that
the Court is not aware of any constitutional requirement of retroactivity that entitles defendants
to the benefit of subsequent Guidelines amendments? 38 As a result, Justice Sotomayor

concluded that§ 3582(c)(2) proceedings

do~}Jplicate a defendants Sixth Amendment right to

have essential facts found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 239 Any facts found by a judge at
a§ 3582(c)(2) proceeding do not serve to increase the prescribed range of punishment, but only
affect the judge's exercise in discretion in reducing the original sentence within the Guidelines
range.

240

As a result, there is no encroachment by judges upon facts historically found by the

jury, nor any threat to the jury's domain at trial. 241
This case exemplifies that Justice Sotomayor does not decide her cases on ideological
grounds. The stereotypical liberal judge tends to side with criminal defendant's rights, and are
more sympathetic to their position. Here, however, Justice Sotomayor evinces her dedication to
the application of the law, and is not influenced by any perceived unfairness to the defendant.
This opinion also sheds light on Justice Sotomayor's interpretation of legislative history and
precedent. Her opinion works methodically through the legislative history of the Sentencing
Reform Act, beginning with its adoption, and working her way to the current state of the law.
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Justice Sotomayor then applies the language of the statute in light of its history and relevant case
law to come to a narrow, competent application of the law to the facts. This is a reflection of
Justice Sotomayor's dedication to the legal profession and her devotion to finding the truth.
3. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011)
In this case, Richard Bryant was convicted by a jury of second degree murder when the
trial court admitted statements that the victim, Anthony Covington, made to police officers who
discovered him mortally wounded in a gas station parking lot. 242 The Michigan Supreme Court
held on appeal that the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, as explained in Crawford v.

Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), and Davis v. Washington, 57 U.S. 813 (2006), made
Covington's statements inadmissible testimonial hearsay, reversing Bryant's conviction.

243

The

Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to determine whether the Confrontation Clause barred
Covington's statements admission at trial. 244 Justice Sotomayor, writing for the majority, held
that Covington's statements were admissible because the primary purpose of the police's
questioning of Covington was to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. 245 As a
result, the Court held that Covington's statements regarding the identification and location of the
shooting were not testimonial, and their admission at Bryant's trial did not violate the
Confrontation Clause?46
Anthony Covington was found by the police lying on the ground at a Detroit gas station
at 3:25 a.m. with a gunshot wound to his abdomen?47 Upon finding Covington, the police asked
him what had happened, who had shot him, and where the shooting occurred.
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248

Covington

stated that someone named "Rick" shot him about twenty minutes earlier, and that he had a
conversation with Bryant through the back door of Bryant's house, and when he turned to leave,
he was shot through the back door and then drove to the gas station?49 The police's conversation
with Covingto~~4~ted between five and ten minutes, when emergency medical

°

services arrived. 25 Covington was then transported to a nearby hospital where he died several
hours later. 251 The police traveled to Bryant's residence, where they found blood, a bullet, a
bullet hole in the back door, and Covington's wallet and identifying information.

252

At trial, Bryant was convicted of second degree murder, being a felon in possession of a
firearm, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. 253 Bryant appealed his
conviction up to the Michigan Supreme Court, arguing that Covington's statements to the police
were testimonial, and thus should not have been admitted at trial in contravention of his
Confrontation Clause rights? 54 The Michigan Supreme Court ultimately concluded that the
primary purpose of the police's interrogation of Covington was to establish the facts of an event
that had already occurred, and thus were not to enable the police to meet an ongoing
emergency. 255
Justice Sotomayor began by stating, "The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment
states: 'In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the
witnesses against him.' The Fourteenth Amendment renders the Confrontation Clause binding
on the States. "256 The Court, in Crawford, examined the history of the Confrontation Clause and
determined that the principal evil

atwhich the Confrontation Clause was meant to eradicate was
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using ex parte communications as evidence against the accused. 257 The Court in that case
limited the Confrontation Clause's reach to testimonial statements and held that in order for
testimonial evidence to be admissible, the Sixth Amendment demands unavailability of the
witness and a prior opportunity to cross-examine him or her. 258 Furthermore, Justice Sotomayor
explained that, at a minimum, Crawford defined testimonial statements as those given during
preliminary hearings, before a grand jury, at a former trial, and police interrogations. 259
The Court, in Davis in 2006, elaborated that, "' [I]nterrogation by law enforcement officer

fi~-~uarely within the class' of testimonial hearsay, we had immediately in mind interrogations
solely directed at establishing the facts of a past crime, in order to identify (or provide evidence
to convict) the perpetrator. The product of such interrogation, whether reduced to a writing
signed by the declarant or embedded in the memory (and perhaps notes) of the interrogating
officer, is testimonial. "'260 Justice Sotomayor then explained that the Court in Davis, thus made
clear that not all those questioned by the police are witnesses and not all interrogations by police
are subject to the Confrontation Clause.Z 61 Justice Sotomayor elaborated that, in Davis, the court
explained, '"Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation
under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to
enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency and that the primary
purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later
criminal prosecution.' " 262 Thus, the Confrontation Clause restricts the introduction of out of
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court statements where state actors are involved in a formal, out of court interrogation of a
witness to obtain evidence for trial. 263
Justice Sotomayor then explained that in order to determine whether the primary purpose
of an interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency, the Court
objectively evaluates the circumstances in which the encounter occurs and the statements and
actions of the parties. 264 Justice Sotomayor then elaborated:
As we suggested in Davis, when a court must determine whether
the Confrontation Clause bars the admission of a statement at trial,
it should determine the "primary purpose of the interrogation" by
objectively evaluating the statements and actions of the parties to
the encounter, in light of the circumstances in which the
interrogation occurs. The existence of an emergency or the
parties' perception that an emergency is ongoing is among the
most important circumstances that courts must take into account in
determining whether an interrogation is testimonial because
statements made to assist police in addressing an ongoing
emergency presumably lack the testimonial purpose that would
subject them to the requirement of confrontation. As the context of
this case brings into sharp relief, the existence and duration of an
emergency depend on the type and scope of danger posed to the
. . the po 1"1ce, and the publ"1c. 265
vtctlm,
Justice Sotomayor stated that in this case, the circumstances surrounding the interrogation
pointed to the occurrence of an ongoing threat because Covington,

~he police, knew the

whereabouts of the shooter. 266 Justice Sotomayor stated, "At bottom, there was an ongoing
emergency here where an armed shooter, whose motive for and location after the shooting were
unknown, had mortally wounded Covington within a few blocks and a few minutes of the
location where the police found Covington. " 267
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Justice Sotomayor then described that the mere existence of an ongoing emergency was
not enough to establish whether Covington's statements were testimonial, but the ultimate
inquiry is whether the primary purpose of the interrogation was to enable police assistance to
meet the ongoing emergency. 268 When the police arrived at the gas station and began
questioning Covington, he was lying on the ground, mortally wounded from a gunshot that
struck him in the abdomen, causing him great pain and limiting his ability to speak. 269
According to the police officers, Covington's statements were often punctuated with questions
about when emergency medical services would arrive. 270 Justice Sotomayor concluded that,
from the description of his condition and report of his statements, a person in Covington's
situation would not have a primary purpose to establish or prove past events potentially relevant

. . 1prosecution.
. 271
to 1ater cnm1na
Similarly, Justice Sotomayor reiterated that the police responded to a call that a man was
shot, without knowing why, where, or when the shooting occurred: neither were the police aware
of the location of the shooter nor anything else regarding the circumstances in which the crime
occurred. 272 Justice Sotomayor, in concluding that the police's primary purpose was not to

establish incriminating evidence for later use at trial, stated that their questiong

the kind

necessary to allow them to assess the situation, the threat to their own safety, and the possible
danger to the victim and the public. As a result, Justice Sotomayor determined that these
circumstances pointed to the primary purpose of assessing and assisting in an ongoing
emergency.
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Finally, Justice Sotomayor considered the informal setting in which the interrogation took
place.

273

Justice Sotomayor concluded that the informality of the situation suggests that the

police officer's primary purpose was simply to address what they perceived to be an ongoing
emergency, and the circumstances lacked any formality that would have alerted Covington to or
focused his attention on the possible future prosecution ofBryant. 274 Justice Sotomayor then
concluded that, because the circumstances of the encounter objectively indicate that the primary
purpose of the interrogation was to enable police assistance to an ongoing emergency,
Covington's statements regarding the identification of Bryant and the location of the shooting
were not testimonial, and the Confrontation Clause did not bar their admittance at trial. 275
This opinion effectively demonstrates Justice Sotomayor's ability to reconcile
complicated facts with precedent in order to reach a no-nonsense, commonsense conclusion.
Here, Covington was bleeding out in the parking lot of a gas station, and when the police arrived,
there was no indication of the location of Bryant and whether or not he posed a continuing threat
to Covington, the police, and the public. Justice Sotomayor relied on her instincts, diligent legal
research, and the fluidity of the situation in order to determine that Covington's statements were
not made in comprehension of future litigation. Furthermore, this opinion evinces the notion that
Justice Sotomayor decides cases not by her ideological standpoint, but by coming to a
commonsense conclusion in light of the facts of each case presented to her.
4. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011)
~.

This case presents the issue of whether or not a defendant

r(;

t.j a patent infringement claim

is required to prove the patent's invalidity by clear and convincing evidence. 276 Respondents i4i
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Limited Partnership hold a patent for an improved method for editing computer documents,
which stores a document's content separately from the metacodes associated with the
document's structure. 277 i4i sued Microsoft for infringement of this patent, claiming that
Microsoft used their patent in its Microsoft Word program. 278 Microsoft denied infringement
and counterclaimed, stating that i4i's patent was invalid and unenforceable. 279 Microsoft
claimed that i4i's patent was

bJ~.by § 102(b) of the Patent Act, which forbids issuing a patent

for an invention that was previously on sale. 280 A jury found that Microsoft had willingly
infringed i4i's patent and that Microsoft failed to prove the patent's invalidity. 281 The District
Court denied Microsoft's motion for post-judgment relief? 82 The Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether a patent
invalidity defense must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. 283
Justice Sotomayor explained that, pursuant to its authority under the Patent Clause of the
constitution, Congress charged the United States Patent and Trademark Office with examining
patent applications and issuing patents if it appears that the applicant is entitled to a patent under
the law.

284

To receive patent protection, a claimed invention must be patentable subject matter,

novel, and nonobvious. 285 There are statutory bars to patent approval under§ 102(b): the
relevant bar in this case precludes patent protection for any invention that was on sale in this
country more than one year prior to the filing of a patent application. 286 If issued, a patent grants
its holder exclusive use of the patent for a period of 20 years from the filing date of the
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application. 287 In order to enforce that right, the patent holder can bring an infringement action
against one who, without permission, makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells the patented
invention. 288 The alleged infringer may assert under§ 282 of the Patent Act that the patent is
invalid and should have not been issued. 289 Under § 282, the patent is presumed to be valid and
imposes the burden of proving its invalidity on the attacker? 90
The dispute in this case arose out of Microsoft's contention that i4i's invention was on
sale more than a year earlier in the United States. 291 The District Court instructed the jury that
Microsoft must have proved i4i's patent invalid by clear and convincing evidence?92
Microsoft's post-judgment motion argued that it only had to prove invalidity by a preponderance
of the evidence. 293 Justice Sotomayor began her analysis by stating that, "Where Congress has
prescribed the governing standard of proof, its choice controls absent countervailing
constitutional constraints. The question, then, is whether Congress has made such a choice
here." 294
Justice Sotomayor held that Congress had made such a choice, by finding that, in
adopting § 282 of the Patent Act, Congress adopted the clear and convincing evidence standard
by codifying the common law meaning of"presumed valid." 295 Justice Sotomayor reached this
conclusion by a methodical analysis of the Patent Act and the common law meaning associated
with the presumption of validity. Justice Sotomayor asserted that, by§ 282's express terms, it
establishes a presumption of patent validity, and it provides that a challenger must overcome that
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presumption to prevail on an invalidity defense. 296 The problem is that the statute does not
expressly articulate the standard ofproof. 297 Justice Sotomayor then stated, "We begin, of
course, with the assumption that the ordinary meaning of the language chosen by Congress
accurately expresses the legislative purpose. But where Congress uses a common-law term in a
statute, we assume the term ... comes with a common law meaning, absent anything pointing
another way." 298 Justice Sotomayor then emphasized that Congress, by stating that a patent is
presumed valid, used a term with a settled meaning in common law? 99
Justice Sotomayor found that the common law recognized that in patent law, there is a
presumption of validity which is not to be overthrown except by clear and cogent evidence, and
that an infringer attacking the validity of a patent bears a heavy burden of persuasion, and fails
unless its evidence has more than a dubious preponderance. 300 As a result, Justice Sotomayor
found that the common
law recognized that a preponderance of the evidence was too light of a
I
;?~

standard ofpro~fdeem a patent invalid. 301 Thus, by the time Congress enacted§ 282, the

1
presumption of patent validity had an established meaning in the common law, notably requiring
clear and convincing evidence to overcome. 302 Justice Sotomayor concluded, that, "Under the
general rule that a common law term comes with its common law meaning, we cannot conclude
that Congress intended to drop the heightened standard proof from the presumption simply
because§ 282 fails to reiterate it expressly." 303 Justice Sotomayor continued, "On the contrary,
we must presume that Congress intended to incorporate the heightened standard of proof, unless
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the statute otherwise dictates." 304 Finding that Congress did not otherwise dictate a different
standard of proof in § 282, it codified the common law presumption of patent validity, and the
heightened standard of proof attached to it. 305 As a result, Justice Sotomayor concluded that an
alleged infringer seeking to prove a patent's invalidity must do so by clear and convincing
evidence. 306
This decision enforces Justice Sotomayor's dedication to the law, and her belief that
judge's apply the law, and do not make it. This is supported by the fact that Justice Sotomayor
rejected Microsoft's contention that a lower standard of proof was warranted when an attacker
presents evidence that was not considered by the PTO. Justice Sotomayor found no evidentiary
or common law policy supporting that contention, and declined to adopt such a rule that had no
basis in the law. This decision also evinces Justice Sotomayor's ability to utilize all of the
statutory interpretation resources that are in the "toolbox" she referenced in her interview with 60
Minutes. Justice Sotomayor utilizes any relevant statutory or common law history that will help

her determine the ultimate truth of the matter.
5. Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 130 S. Ct. 2485 (2010)

In this case, the Supreme Court determined that ~ule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
jJ#J
Procedure, which governs when a claim that has pa~ the statute of limitations relates back to the
timely filing of a previous complaint, depends on what the party to be added to the suit knew or
should have known, not on the amending party's knowledge or timeliness in seeking to amend
the pleading. 307
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Wanda Krupski was injured on February 21, 2007, when she tripped over a cable and
fractured her femur on board a cruise ship owned by Costa Croci ere. 308 Krupski retained an
attorney and began a personal injury suit upon returning home, using her admission ticket as the
sole contract between her and the Costa Crociere.
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The ticket stated that Costa Crociere was an v~~/./··· '
,r'

Italian corporation that owned all of the vessels and other ships owned and operated by Costa
Crociere. 310 The ticket further provided that an injured party submit written notice of their claim
to the carrier or its duly authorized agent within 185 days after the injury and required any
lawsuit to be filed within one year after the date of the injury and to be served upon the carrier
within 120 days offiling. 311 The ticket further extended the defenses, limitations, and exceptions
that may be invoked by the carrier to all persons and organizations who may act on behalf of the
carrier, including Costa Cruise Lines, the carrier's sales and marketing agent. 312 The ticket also
listed Costa Cruise Lines' Florida address and stated than an entity called Costa Cruises was the
first cruise company in the world to obtain a certain certification of quality. 313
Krupski's attorney notified Costa Cruise Lines of Krupski's claims, and Costa Cruise
Lines' claims administrator requested additional information in order to facilitate settlement
discussions. 314 Settlement discussions broke down, and Krupski filed a negligence suit against
Costa Cruise Lines three weeks before the one year limitations period ended in the Federal
District Court for the Southern District ofFlorida. 315 Krupski alleged that Costa Cruise owned,
operated, managed, supervised and controlled the ship on which Krupski was injured, that Costa
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Cruise owed a duty to its passengers, which was subsequently breached by its failure to take

. .
316
steps to prevent her InJury.
After the limitations period had expired, Costa Cruise brought the existence of Costa
Crociere to Krupski's attention on three occasions, and on May 6, 2008, Costa Cruise moved for
summary judgment, stating that Costa Crociere was the proper defendant. 317 Krupski responded
by arguing for limited discovery to determine whether Costa Cruise should be dismissed.

318

According to Krupski, she believed Costa Cruise Lines to be the proper party to file a claim
against because the travel documents prominently identified and displayed Costa Cruise Lines
and its address, Costa Cruise's website listed its address as the United States office for the Italian
company Costa Croci ere, and the Florida Department of State listed Costa Cruise as the only
"Costa" company registered to do business in that state. 319 Krupski also relied on the fact that
Costa Cruise's claims administrator responded to her without indicating that it was not a
responsible party. 320 With her response, Krupski moved to amend her complaint to add Costa
Crociere as a defendant. 321 The District Court then denied Costa Cruise's motion for summary
v

r:

1

judgment and granted Krupski's motion for leave to amend her claim, and ordered Krupsk!fffect
service on Costa Croci ere. 322
Krupski filed an amended claim on July 11, 2008, and served Costa Croci ere on August
21, 2008. 323 Costa Crociere, represented by the same counsel that represented Costa Cruise,
moved to dismiss the complaint against it, arguing that the claim did not relate back under
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 15(c), and was therefore untimely. 324 The District Court
agreed. 325 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court, stating that
because Krupski's admissions ticket identified the proper party to be sued, Krupski knew or
should have known of Costa Croci ere's identity as a proper party. 326
Justice Sotomayor, writing for the majority, held that the District Court and the Eleventh
Circuit's dismissal of the claim was improper, as the question under Rule 15(c)(l)(C)(ii) is not
whether Krupski knew or should have known the identity of Costa Crociere as the proper
defendant, but whether Costa Crociere knew or should have known that it would have been
named as a defendant but for an error. Justice Sotomayor reached this conclusion by stating that
information in the plaintiff's possession is relevant only if it bears on the defendant's
understanding of whether the plaintiff made a mistake regarding the proper party's identity. 327
Justice Sotomayor continued to state that the reasonableness of the mistake is not itself an
issue. 328 Justice Sotomayor explained that, "A prospective defendant who legitimately believed
that the limitations period had passed without any attempt to sue him has a strong interest in
repose. But repose would be a windfall for a prospective defendant who understood, or who
should have understood, that he escaped suit during the limitations period only because the
plaintiff misunderstood a crucial fact about his identity. Because a plaintiffs knowledge of the
existence of a party does not foreclose the possibility that she has made a mistake of identity
about which that party should have been aware, such knowledge does not support that party's
.
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Justice Sotomayor further stated that the question under Rule 15(c)(1 )(C)(ii) is what the
prospective defendant reasonably should have understood about the plaintiffs intent in filing the
original complaint against the first defendant. In light of that fact, Justice Sotomayor held that
Costa Crociere had notice that Krupski meant to sue it, and not Costa Cruise. 330 The complaint
makes clear that Krupski meant to sue the company that owned, operated, managed, supervised
and controlled the ship on which she was injured, and because it mistakenly identified Costa
Cruise Lines as performing those roles, Costa Croci ere should have known that it was not named
as a defendant in the complaint only because of Krupski's misunderstanding about which
company was in charge of the ship. 331 Costa Crociere and Costa Cruise are also closely related
companies with similar names, and were represented by the same counsel, further evincing the
fact that Costa Crociere knew or should have known that it would have been named as a
defendant but for Krupski's mistake. 332 As a result, Justice Sotomayor found that Krupski's
claim against Costa Crociere did relate back to her original claim against Costa Cruise Lines, and
was thus not time barred.
This case demonstrates Justice Sotomayor's desire to ultimately find the truth and have a
matter litigated. Justice Sotomayor is dedicated to resolving claims on their merits, which can be
traced back to her afternoons spent watching Perry Mason. Throughout her career, Justice
Sotomayor has been focused on the pursuit of the truth, and Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure is a means in which an otherwise time barred complaint can be heard and
adjudicated on its merits. Justice Sotomayor's ultimate goal is achieving justice through the
application of the law to the facts in front of her, and this case squarely demonstrates her
commonsense application of the law. Rule 15(C) expressly states, "[I]fRule 15(c)(1)(B) is
330
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satisfied and if. .. the party to be brought in by amendment received such notice of the action that
it will not be prejudiced in defending on the merits, and knew or should have known that the
action would have been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party's
identity."333 As a result, the commonsense solution to this case was to apply the plain language
of Rule 15(c) to Krupski's complaint, thus allowing her to have her claim adjudicated on the
merits.
B. Concurrences
6. United States v. Tohono O'Odham Nation, 131 S. Ct. 1723 (2011)
In this case, the Tohono O'Odham Nation, an Indian Tribe with federal recognition,
brought two actions against the U.S. government, alleging a breach of fiduciary duty with respect
to the Nation's lands and other assets. 334 The Tohono Nation brought an action against federal
officials in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia alleging that the officials
responsible for managing the tribal assets held by the federal government breached their
fiduciary duty. 335 The complaint in the District Court requested equitable relief, including an
accounting of the Nation's assets. 336 The Nation also filed a claim in the United States Court of
Federal Claims describing the same assets and fiduciary duties alleged in the District Court
complaint for which it

reques~oney damages.

337

The Court of Federal Claims dismissed the

claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1500 for want of jurisdiction. 338 The Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit reversed, stating that the claims were not for or in respect to the same claim, as there was
no overlap in the relief requested in each court.
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Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, began by evaluating the law in which the Court
of Federal Claims dismissed the Nation's suit. 339 Justice Kennedy pointed out that Congress has
restricted the Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1500 over a claim if the
plaintiff has another suit for or in respect to that claim pending against the United States or its
agents. 340 Justice Kennedy pointed out that the question to be resolved is what it means for two
suits to be "for or in respect to" the same claim. 341 According to Keene Corp. v. US., 508 U.S.
200 (1993), two suits are for or in respect to the same claim when they are based on substantially
the same operative facts, and at least if there is some overlap in the relief requested. 342
According to Justice Kennedy, the Keene case left open whether the jurisdictional bar also
operates if the suits are based on the same operative facts but do not seek overlapping relief. 343
Justice Kennedy pointed to the Keene decision to state that the possible construction of § 1500
was limited to situations that require substantive factual and some remedial overlap, or
substantial factual overlap without more. 344
Justice Kennedy concluded by holding that the jurisdictional bar at issue in § 1500 refers
to situations where the two actions have substantial factual overlap without regard to any
remedial overlap. 345 Justice Kennedy came to this conclusion by stating that § 1500 bars
jurisdiction in the Court ofF ederal Claims not only, if the sues on an identical claim elsewhere,
- ~....-'\._

but also if the plaintiffs other action is related although not identical to the other claim. 346
Pointing to§ 1500's broad language, Justice Kennedy stated that it makes clear Congress did not
intend the statute to be rendered useless by a narrow concept of identity, but suggests a board
339
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Justice Kennedy stated that, because the statute used similar language elsewhere,

the jurisdictional bar's application to overlapping facts is the more reasonable interpretation. 348
In light of the other passage cited by Justice Kennedy, he explained that, "Although the two
phrases are not identical--one is in respect to a claim, the other a cause of action-they are
almost so, and there is reason to think that both phrases refer to facts alone and not to relief." 349
Justice Kennedy also stated that reading § 1500 to require only factual and not also
remedial overlap makes sense in light of the unique remedial powers of the Court ofF ederal
Claims? 50 Justice Kennedy pointed out that the Court of Federal Claims is the only jurisdiction
for non-tort requests for significant money damages in the United States, and it has no general
power to provide equitable relief against the government or its officers. 351 As a result, Justice
Kennedy stated that the distinct jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims makes overlapping
relief the exception and distinct relief the norm, and, for that reason, a statute aimed at
precluding suits in the Court of Federal Claims that duplicate suits elsewhere would be unlikely
to require remedial overlap? 52 Finally, Justice Kennedy pointed out that the statute's purpose is
to save the government from the burdens of redundant litigation, and that the conclusion that two
suits are for or in respect to the same claim when they are based on substantially the same
operative facts allows the statute to achieve its aim. 353 Thus, Justice Kennedy concluded that, in
order for a claim to be barred under the jurisdictional limitation of§ 1500, the two cases need
only share substantially similar facts and not some overlapping relief. 354
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Justice Sotomayor concurred in the judgment, but wrote separately to state her belief that,
while she agreed that§ 1500 barred the Nation's action in the Court of Federal Claims, the Court
should not have decided whether§ 1500 bars an action when the plaintiffs actions share a
common factual basis but seek different forms of relief. 355 Justice Sotomayor stated that § 1500
bars jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims over any claim that is for or in respect to which
the plaintiff has pending in any other court any suit or process against the United States. 356
Justice Sotomayor pointed out that the Court, in Keene, constructed the statute to turn on whether
the plaintiffs other suit was based on substantially the same operative facts as the Court of
Claims action, at least if there was some overlap in the reliefrequested. 357 The Court in Keene
found it unnecessary to consider whether§ 1500 barred a Court of Federal Claims claim that was
based on substantially the same operative facts as another suit but that sought different relief. 358
Justice Sotomayor believed that, in this case, the Nation sought overlapping relief in the
District Court and the Court of Federal Claims based on identical facts. 359 Because, in Justice
Sotomayor's view, the Nation sought overlapping relief in both complaints that were based on
substantially the same operative facts, § 1500 would have barred its action in the Court of
Federal Claims and there was no need to reach the broader holding that a claim is barred under §
1500 if it only shares substantial facts without overlapping relief. 360 As a result, Justice
Sotomayor would have affirmed the District Court's opinion that the Nation's Court of Federal
Claims claim was barred by§ 1500, but would have gone no further.
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Justice Sotomayor took issue with the majority's eager dismissal of the judicial restraint
evidenced in Keene. 361 Justice Sotomayor felt the Court unnecessarily chose to hold that § 1500
bars jurisdiction in the Court ofF ederal Claims whenever a plaintiffs Court ofF ederal Claims
action is based on substantially the same facts as a suit pending elsewhere. 362 Especially
irksome, Justice Sotomayor pointed out that on numerous occasions Congress has chosen to
require plaintiffs to file actions in two different courts to obtain complete relief relating to a
single set of operative facts. 363 As an example, Justice Sotomayor pointed to the fact that the
Court ofF ederal Claims has no power to issue equitable relief, thus a plaintiff seeking both
money damages and injunctive relief to remedy distinct harms arising from the same set of facts
may be forced to file actions in both the Court of Federal Claims and federal district court. 364
However, as Justice Sotomayor explained, "Under the Court's construction of§ 1500, plaintiffs
whom Congress has forced to file parallel action in the CFC and a district court to obtain
complete relief must now choose either to forgo relief in the district court or to file first in the
district court and risk the expiration of the statute of limitations on their claims in the CFC. " 365
In this case, Justice Sotomayor displays much of the same jurisprudence evidenced in
Krupski. Justice Sotomayor favors judicial restraint in favor of an activist court. This decision

exemplifies that point. Justice Sotomayor saw no reason to upset the Court's precedent relating
to§ 1500, as the issue that the Court decided here was not central to the court's conclusion that
the Nation's action was barred in the Court of Federal Claims. Justice Sotomayor believes that
the role of the judge is to apply law, not to make law, and the Court's opinion here can be said to
create law through its own interpretation of§ 1500. Justice Sotomayor concurred only in the
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judgment of this case because the Court's disposition of the case does not comport with Justice
Sotomayor's jurisprudence of narrowly construing the law to fit the facts presented.
7. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011)
Justice Sotomayor's jurisprudential philosophy that the Court shall not decide questions
that will have no effect on the outcome of the case is also prevalent in this case. Justice
Sotomayor concurred in the Court's judgment, however she did not join the Court's majority
opinion because she believed it decided a question that held no bearing on the narrow issue at
hand.
This case arose out of the alleged material witness arrest of al-Kidd, an American citizen,
as he was checked in for a flight to Saudi Arabia. 366 Al-Kidd was arrested as a material witness
two days after federal authorities notified a Magistrate Judge that, if al-Kidd boarded the flight to
Saudi Arabia, they believed information crucial to the prosecution of Sami Omar al-Hussayen
would be lost. 367 As a result, the Magistrate Judge issued an arrest warrant for al-Kidd, and he
was held in federal custody for the following sixteen days and on federal supervised release until
al-Hussayen's trial concluded fourteen months later. 368 However, the prosecution never called
al-Kidd as a witness against al-Hussayen. 369
Al-Kidd alleged that, following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Attorney
General John Ashcroft authorized federal prosecutors to use the material witness statute to detain
individuals with suspected ties to terrorists. 370 Al-Kidd alleges that the federal officials had no
intention of calling many of these individuals as witnesses, and that they were detained at
Ashcroft's direction because they were suspected of ties to terrorist organization, but there was
366
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not sufficient evidence to charge them with a crime. 371 It was further alleged that this pretextual
detention led to the material witness arrest of al-Kidd. 372 As a result, al-Kidd filed a Bivens suit
against Ashcroft, challenging the constitutionality of his alleged policy. 373 Ashcroft filed a
motion to dismiss based on absolute and qualified immunity, which was denied by the District
Court, and affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, holding that the Fourth Amendment prohibits
pretextual arrests absent probable cause of criminal wrongdoing, and that Ashcroft could not
. qual.fi
.
. 374
c1aim
I Ie d or a b so1ute Immunity.
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that al-Kidd's Fourth Amendment rights
were not violated because an objectively reasonable arrest and detention of a material witness
pursuant to a validly obtained warrant cannot be challenged as unconstitutional on the basis of
allegations that the arresting authority had an improper motive. 375 The Court also held that
Ashcroft enjoyed qualified immunity because he did not violate clearly established law? 76
Justice Scalia held that al-Kidd's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated because his
arrest was objectively reasonable, and that a validly obtained arrest warrant cannot be challenged
as unconstitutional on the basis of allegations that the arresting authority had an improper
motive? 77 In reaching this conclusion, Justice Scalia reasoned that under the Fourth
Amendment, an arrest must be reasonable under the circumstances, and that this reasonableness
is predominantly an objective inquiry. 378 In determining the reasonableness of an arrest, Justice
Scalia stated that the Court examines whether the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify the
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challenged action, and if so, that action was reasonable whatever the subjective intent motivating
the relevant officials. 379
The two exceptions to objective inquiry of reasonableness are the Court's special needs
and administrative search cases, where actual motivations do matter. 380 Under these
circumstances, a judicial warrant and probable cause are not needed where the search or seizure
is justified by special needs. 381 Justice Scalia quickly reasoned, however, that these cases do not
apply to situations, as al-Kidd's, where the arrest is based on a properly issued judicial
warrant. 382 As such, Justice Scalia found that al-Kidd's arrest was based on a properly issued
material witness warrant, thus foregoing any investigation as to Attorney General Ashcroft's
subjective intent in having al-Kidd detained.

383

Justice Scalia then also held that Attorney General Ashcroft enjoyed qualified immunity
384

because he did not act in violation of clearly established law.

Justice Scalia reasoned that

qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from money damages unless a plaintiff
pleads facts showing that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and that the right
was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.

385

Justice Scalia continued to

explain that a government official's conduct violates a clearly established law when, at the time
of the challenged conduct, the contours of a right are sufficiently clear that every reasonable
officer would have understood that what he is doing violates that right. 386 Justice Scalia then
pointed out that, at the time of al-Kidd's arrest, not a single judicial opinion had held that pretext
could render an objectively reasonable arrest pursuant to a material witness warrant
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unconstitutional. 387 As a result of that observation, Justice Scalia held that Attorney General
Ashcroft deserves qualified immunity because his conduct did not violate any clearly established

.·r-lx

law.388

Justice Sotomayor, in another display of her committal to judicial restraint and deciding
/

only the narrow question in front of her, concurred in the majority's judgment alone, because she
believed that Attorney General Ashcroft enjoyed qualified immunity for the reasons stated in the
majority's opinion. 389 Justice Sotomayor reasoned, however, "I cannot join the majority's
opinion, however, because it unnecessarily 'resolves a difficult and novel question of
constitutional interpretation that will have no effect on the outcome of the case. "'390
Justice Sotomayor believed that whether the Fourth Amendment permits the pretextual
use of a material witness warrant for preventative detention of an individual whom the
government has no indication of using at trial is a question not needing an answer in this case. 391
Justice Sotomayor reasoned that the Court has never determined whether an official's subjective
intent matters for purposes of the Fourth Amendment in that context, and the Court need not and
should not resolve that question in this case. 392 Justice Sotomayor further explained that the
Court's holding is premised on the existence of a validly

issu:~aterial witness warrant, which

she points out, is questionable, given the al-Kidd's allegations. 393 Justice Sotomayor further
states that, based on the al-Kidd's allegations, it is not clear that it would have been impractical
to secure his presence by subpoena or that his testimony could be adequately secured by
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deposition. 394 In Justice Sotomayor's mind, it was also not clear whether the warrant issued to
secure al-Kidd's arrest was sufficient, as the government failed to disclose that it had no
intention of utilizing al-Kidd at trial. 395 As a result, Justice Sotomayor would have limited the
Court's holding to which all of its members agreed, that Attorney General Ashcroft enjoyed
qualified immunity because he did not violate clearly established law. 396
Justice Sotomayor firmly believes in judicial restraint. This jurisprudential philosophy is
evident in her concurrence to the Majority's opinion in this case. The search for truth here does
not involve resolving a question of constitutional right upon assuming away factual details that
would be crucial to the matters ultimate adjudication. The Court's holding that the Fourth
Amendment had not been violated was completely dispensable to its ultimate conclusion that
Attorney General Ashcroft enjoyed qualified immunity because he did not violate clearly
established law. This case is a prime example of Justice Sotomayor's view that the role of a
judge is to apply the law, and not to make it.
8. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011)
In this case the Court was faced with the question of whether the Confrontation Clause
permiJ:s,.the prosecution from introducing a forensic report containing testimonial certification

()-~-

~~-----~/

made for the purpose of establishing a particular fact, through the testimony of a scientist who
did not sign the certification, and did not perform or observe the test reported in the
certification. 397 Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, held that surrogate testimony
regarding the certification at issue did not comport with the Confrontation Clause, and that
accused's right is to be confronted with the analyst who made the certification, unless that
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analyst is unavailable at trial, and the accused had an opportunity to cross-examine that particular
analyst pre-trial. 398
Donald Bullcoming was arrested for driving while intoxicated when the vehicle he was
driving rear-ended a pick-up truck. 399 Bullcoming fled the scene of the accident before the
police arrived, however, he was shortly the~eafter apprehended, and subsequently failed the field

sobriety tests. 400 Bullcoming refuset;e Breathalyzer examination, and as a result, the police
obtained a warrant authorizing a blood-alcohol analysis. 401 Pursuant thereto, Bullcoming was
taken to a hospital where his blood was taken. 402 The police then sent the sample to the New
Mexico Department of Health, Scientific Laboratory Division (SLD), in order to be evaluated. 403
Curtis Caylor, completed and signed the SLD forensic report, which stated that Bullcoming had a
blood alcohol content (BAC) of0.21 grams, an inordinately high level. 404
Caylor, on the report, certified that he had received the sample with an unbroken seal,
that the information in the report was correct, and that he followed the procedures set out on the
opposite side of the report. 405 The SLD examiner then certified that Caylor was qualified to
conduct the BAC test, and that the established procedure for handling and analyzing
Bullcoming's sample had been followed. 406 According to Justice Ginsburg, the SLD analysts
utilize a gas chromatograph machine to determine BAC levels, and that the operation of the
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machine requires specialized knowledge and training. 407 It was also recognized that several steps
are involved in the gas chromatograph process, and human error can occur at each step. 408
As a result of the BAC analysis, Bullcoming became subject to New Mexico's
aggravated DWI charge. 409 At trial, the SLD announced that it would not produce Caylor to
testify as to the analysis' authenticity, because Caylor had subsequently been placed on unpaid
leave for an unspecified reason. 410 The State then proposed to introduce the report as a business
record during the testimony of Gerasimos Razatos, an SLD scientist who neither observed nor
reviewed Caylor's report. 411 Bullcoming's counsel opposed that proposal, stating that the
prosecution had not disclosed the unavailability of Caylor until trial, and that her entire defense
may have been different if this information was previously disclosed. 412 The trial court
overruled the objection, and Razatos' testimony regarding the report was admitted. 413 The jury
found Bullcoming guilty ofDWI, which the Court of Appeals and the New Mexico Supreme
Court affirmed, stating that the BAC report was non-testimonial. 414
Justice Ginsburg held that if an out of court statement is testimonial in nature, it may not
be introduced against the accused at trial unless the witness who made the statement is
unavailable and the accused had a prior opportunity to confront the witness. 415 Justice Ginsburg
reasoned that the Confrontation Clause confers upon the accused in all criminal prosecutions, the
right to be confronted with the witness against him. 416 The Court further noted that in order to
comport with the Confrontation Clause, testimonial evidence is only admissible at trial if the
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witness who made the statement is unavailable and the opposition had a prior opportunity to
cross-examine him or her.

417

Justice Ginsburg also noted that, while Bullcoming's appeal was

pending, the Court decided Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009). 418 The
Court in Melendez-Diaz held that affidavits reporting forensic analysis submitted to the Court
qualify as testimonial evidence, rendering the affiant's subject to the Confrontation Clause. 419
As a result, Justice Ginsburg held that an analyst's certification prepared in connection with a
criminal investigation or prosecution is testimonial, thus subjecting Caylor's report to the
Confrontation Clause.

420

As a result of the foregoing analysis, Razatos' testimony regarding the BAC report must
have comported with the Confrontation Clause. The New Mexico Supreme Court ruled that
Razatos' surrogate testimony regarding Caylor's report was adequate to satisfy the Confrontation
Clause because Caylor simply transcribed the results generated by the gas chromatograph.

421

Justice Ginsburg held, however, that Caylor's report was more than a mere report of a machine
generated number because Caylor certified that he followed all the relevant procedures and that
no circumstance or condition affected the validity of the analysis. 422 Such certification rendered
Caylor's report and Caylor open to cross-examination. 423 As a result, because Caylor's report
was testimonial, and because the state never asserted Caylor's unavailability, the prosecution
never had a chance at cross examining him regarding the report he submitted.424 Accordingly,
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Caylor became a witness that Bullcoming had the right to confront, and Razatos' surrogate
testimony regarding the report did not satisfy the Confrontation Clause. 425
Justice Sotomayor concurred in part to the opinion in order to state her opinion as to why
the report was testimonial, and also to emphasize the limited reach of the Court's opinion. 426
This concurrence further demonstrates Justice Sotomayor's jurisprudential philosophy that the
Court's opinions should be narrowly construed to the issue presented, and her belief that the role
of the judge is to apply the law is clearly displayed in this case, as she wrote separately to
specifically point out what the Court's opinion did not hold.
Justice Sotomayor emphasized that she agrees with the Majority that the trial court erred
in admitting the BAC report at trial because its primary purpose was to create an out-of-court
substitute for testimony. 427 Justice Sotomayor further reasoned that the report at issue in this
case was testimonial because its primary purpose was to incontrovertibly establish or prove some
fact. 428 Justice Sotomayor then concluded that the BAC report at issue had as its primary
purpose establishing evidence that Bullcoming was driving while intoxicated, rendering it
.
. 1429
testimonia
.

Justice Sotomayor's concurrence demonstrates her jurisprudence, however, because she
wrote separately to identify the factual circumstances that this case does not represent.
Sotomayor observed that:
First, this is not a case in which the State suggested an alternate
purpose, much less an alternate primary purpose ... Second, this is
not a case in which the person testifying is a supervisor, reviewer,
or someone else with a personal, albeit limited, connection to the
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430

Justice

scientific test at issue ... Third, this is not a case in which an expert
witness was asked for his independent opinion about underlying
testimonial report that were not themselves admitted into
evidence ... Finally, this is not a case in which the State introduced
only machine-generated results, such as a printout from a gas
431
chromatograph.
In addressing these factual circumstances in which the Court's opinion does not address, Justice
Sotomayor points out that this is not a case in which the Court decided whether a purely machine
generated printout could be introduced at trial with the testimony of an expert witness. 432 In
pointing out these circumstances, Justice Sotomayor limited the Court's finding to the specific
reports at issue in this case. Thus, Justice Sotomayor left open the question as to whether one, or
any, ofthese circumstances would)\1nfluence the testimonial nature of such a report.
Justice Sotomayor displayed her goal of applying the law to the specific facts presented,
and reinforced her philosophy that judges do not make law. By limiting her concurrence to only
the specific factual circumstances presented in this case, Justice Sotomayor affirmed that her
name would not be associated with an opinion that created law and foreclosed future arguments
that can be made for the admittance of evidence where the factual circumstances are different
than those presented here.

C. Dissents
9. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010).
This case further presents Justice Sotomayor's committal to only resolving the specific
issue presented to the Court. In this case, Justice Sotomayor dissented, primarily on the basis
that she viewed the court as creating law, and not merely applying it.
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On January 10, 2000, a shooting occurred outside of a mall in Michigan, injuring two
people, leaving one of them dead from multiple gun shots. 433 The suspect, Thompkins, fled to
Ohio where he was found and arrested about one year later. 434 Thompkins was interrogated by
two police officers for almost three hours in an eight by ten foot room. 435 At the beginning of the
interrogation Thompkins was presented with a form that informed him of his Miranda rights,
which Thompkins read aloud, but refused to sign in order to demonstrate he understood those
rights. 436 The officers then began the interrogation, in which Thompkins remained
predominantly silent for the entire three hours. 437 Thompkins did not state that he wanted to
remain silent, but his only verbal responses were an occasional "yeah," "no," or "I don't
know." 438 The only affirmative statements Thompkins made were stating that he did not want a
peppermint, and that the chair he was sitting in was hard.

439

Two hours and forty-five minutes into the interrogation, one of the officers asked
Thompkins, '"Do you believe in God?" 440 Thompkins responded by stating, '"Yes. "'

441

The

officer then asked Thompkins, '"Do you pray to God?" 442 Thompkins again responded by
saying, '"Yes. "'443 Then, the officer asked Thompkins, '"Do you pray to God to forgive you for
shooting that boy down?'"444 Thompkins then answered, "Yes," and looked away from the
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officer. 445 Shortly thereafter, Thompkins refused to sign a written confession, and the
.
. ended.446
Interrogation

Thompkins was charged with first-degree murder, assault with intent to commit murder,
and other firearms related offenses. 447 Thompkins moved to suppress the statements concerning
his belief in God during the interrogation, arguing that he invoked his right to remain silent under

Miranda, therefore requiring the officer's to end the interrogation. 448 The trial court denied
Thompkins' motion, and the jury subsequently found him guilty on all counts. 449 On appeal, the
Michigan Court of Appeals upheld Thompkins' guilty verdict and stated that Thompkins did not
invoke his right to remain silent and that he subsequently waived that right. 450 The Michigan
Supreme Court denied discretionary review, and Thompkins subsequently filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, in
which the District Court rejected Thompkins' argument that he invoked his right to remain
silent. 451 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that Thompkins invoked
his right to remain to silent by holding that an invocation of that right need not be express, and
because Thompkins remained almost entirely silent for the first two hours and forty-five minutes
.
. 452
of the Interrogation.

Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority of the Court, held that Thompkins did not
invoke his right to remain silent under Miranda, because one who wishes to invoke that right
must do so unambiguously. 453 In rejecting Thompkins' argument that he invoked his right to
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remain silent by not saying anything for a sufficient amount of time, Justice Kennedy relied on
the Court's decision in Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994), which held that a defendant
wishing to invoke his or her right to counsel, must do so unambiguously. 454 Justice Kennedy
reasoned, the Court had yet to state whether an invocation of the right to remain silent can be
ambiguous or equivocal, but stated that there was no principled reason to adopt different
standards for determining when an accused has invoked the Miranda right to remain silent and
the Miranda right to counsel at issue in Davis. 455
Justifying this holding, Justice Kennedy stated that, requiring a suspect to unambiguously
invoke the right to remain silent avoids difficulties of proof and provides guidance to officers on
how to proceed in the face of ambiguity.

456

Justice Kennedy continued that, if an ambiguous act,

omission, or statement could require police to end the interrogation, police would be required to
make difficult decisions about an accused's unclear intent and face the consequence of
suppression if they guessed wrong. 457 Accordingly, because Thompkins did not unambiguously
state that he wanted to remain silent or that he did not want to speak to the police, the Court held
that he had not invoked his right to remain silent. 458
Justice Sotomayor wrote a dissenting opinion which evinces her jurisprudential
commonsense and her philosophy on judicial restraint. Justice Sotomayor began her dissent by
stating, "The Court also concludes that a suspect who wishes to guard his right to remain silent
against such a finding of 'waiver' must, counterintuitively, speak-and must do so with
sufficient precision to satisfy a clear-statement rule that construes ambiguity in favor of the
poli'ce ... The broad rules the Court announces today are also troubling because they are
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unnecessary to decide this case, which is governed by the deferential standard of review set forth
in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996."459
Justice Sotomayor began her dissent by chastising the majority's downplay of the factual
circumstances surrounding Thompkins' investigation. 460 Justice Sotomayor emphasized that
Thompkins remained almost completely silent and unresponsive throughout the entirety of the
interrogation, pointing to the interrogating officer's categorization of the interrogation as "nearly
a monologue."461 Justice Sotomayor also pointed out that, other than the statements made at the
end of the interrogation, the only other statements the interrogating officer could remember that
Thompkins' made were that he did not want a peppermint, and that the chair he was sitting in
was hard. 462
Justice Sotomayor, addressing Thompkins' argument that his conduct during the
interrogation invoked his right to remain silent, stated that she, like the Sixth Circuit, would not
have reached this question because she believes Thompkins was entitled to relief under
waiver.463 Justice Sotomayor dissented here because she could not agree with the Court's broad
ruling that a suspect must clearly invoke his right to silence by speaking. 464 According to Justice
Sotomayor, "[T]oday's novel clear-statement rule for invocation invites police to question a
suspect at length-notwithstanding his persistent refusal to answer questions-in the hope of
eventually obtaining a single inculpatory response which will suffice to prove waiver of
rights." 465
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Justice Sotomayor pointed to several sources for her conclusion that the Majority was
wrong in its holding. First, Justice Sotomayor stated that Miranda itself concluded that if an
individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning that he wishes to
remain silent, the interrogation must cease, and that any statement taken after the person invokes
this privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion. 466 Thus, Justice Sotomayor
believes that the admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to
remain silent depends on whether the right to cut off questioning was scrupulously honored. 467
Secondly, Justice Sotomayor stated that the Court was incorrect in extending the ruling in

Davis to the right to remain silent.

468

As Justice Sotomayor provided, the Court mistakenly

applied Davis because it involved the right to counsel, not the right to remain silent, and that

Miranda had recognized the difference between the procedural safeguards triggered by a request
to remain silent and a request for an attomey. 469 Justice Sotomayor, in stating the standard she
believed to be appropriate, reasoned that, after an ambiguous invocation of the right to remain
silent, the inquiry should be limited to whether the suspect's right to cut off questioning was
scrupulously honored by the police. 470 According to Justice Sotomayor, this standard is
precautionary and fact specific, with an ability to acknowledge that some statements or conduct
are so equivocal that police may scrupulously honor a suspect's rights without terminating
questioning, and that others, in particular, when a suspect sits silent throughout prolonged
interrogation, cannot reasonably be understood other than as an invocation of the right to remain
silent. 471
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Justice Sotomayor further stated that the Davis rule does not comport with the right to
remain silent because advising a suspect that he has a right to remain silent is unlikely to convey
that he must speak in order to ensure the right will be protected. 472 By contrast, Justice
Sotomayor reasoned that advising a suspect that he has the right to the presence of an attorney
implies the need for speech to exercise that right. 473 As a result, Justice Sotomayor believes that
the Court's decision in this case turned Miranda upside down because criminal suspects must
now unambiguously invoke their right to remain silent-which, counterintuitively, requires them
to speak. 474
This dissent perfectly embodies two of Justice Sotomayor's major jurisprudential tenets.
First, Justice Sotomayor's advocacy of judicial restraint is on display. Once again, Justice
Sotomayor would not have reached the conclusion regarding a criminal suspect's invocation of
his or her right to remain silent, because she believes that decision was not mandated by the
factual circumstances in front of the court. Justice Sotomayor firmly believes that the role of the
judge is to apply law, and not to make law. Because Justice Sotomayor believed the AEDP A
adequately resolved the issue in front of the Court, she believed it unnecessary to reach such a
broad ruling concerning the Miranda right to silence. Justice Sotomayor thus believes that this
decision unnecessarily decides a question that, not only was not in front of the Court, but also
has wide implications for constitutional rights.
Second, this opinion fits squarely within Justice Sotomayor's jurisprudential
commonsense application of the law. As Justice Sotomayor sees it, Davis' holding, that an
unambiguous statement is needed in order to invoke the right to counsel does not parallel
Thompkins' invocation of his right to remain silent. Furthermore, a rule respecting the right of a
472
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criminal suspect to remain silent does not imply that he or she must do the opposite-speak-in
order to invoke that right. As a result, Justice Sotomayor does not believe the Court's holding to
be a commonsense application of its precedent, or a commonsense application of human nature.
10. Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011)

This case, in which Justice Sotomayor dissented, involves Congress' enactment of the
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), and whether Arizona's Legal Arizona Workers
Act, which provides that the licenses of state employers that knowingly or intentionally employ
unauthorized aliens may be suspended or revoked, is expressly and impliedly preempted by
federal immigration law. 475 The Majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Roberts, concluded
that Arizona's licensing law is not expressly preempted, and that Arizona's E-verify mandate is
. 1.1edl y preempted .476
not 1mp

The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) makes it unlawful for a person or other
entity to hire, or to recruit or refer for a fee, for employment in the United States an alien
knowing ~.the alien is an unauthorized alien. 477 Employers that violate that
prohibition may be subjected to federal civil and criminal sanctions, and IRCA also expressly
preempts any state or local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions, other than through licensing
and similar laws, upon those who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment
.
478
. d a11ens.
unauthonze

Under Arizona's Legal Arizona Workers Act, the state allows Arizona courts to suspend
or revoke the licenses necessary to do business in the state if an employer knowingly or
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intentionally employs an unauthorized alien. 479 Under the Arizona law, if an employer is found
to have knowingly employed an unauthorized alien, the court must order the employer to
terminate the employment of all unauthorized aliens and file quarterly reports on all new hires
for a probationary period of three years. 480 The court may also order the appropriate agencies to
suspend all licenses that are held by the employer for a period not to exceed ten business days.481
A second knowing violation requires that the court permanently revoke all licenses that are held
by the employer specific to the business location where the unauthorized alien performed
work.

482

Chief Justice and the Majority concluded that Arizona's law is not expressly preempted
by IRCA because the law falls within the confines of the authority Congress chose to leave to the
states. 483 Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that, while IRCA prohibits states from imposing civil or
criminal sanctions on those who employ unauthorized aliens, it preserves the state's authority to
impose sanctions through licensing and similar laws. 484 According to Chief Justice Roberts, the
Arizona law is not preempted because it merely instructs courts to suspend or revoke the
business licenses of in-state employers that employ unauthorized aliens. 485 Also, because
Arizona's definition of "license" in its law is substantially similar to the definition of "license"
that Congress codified in the Administrative Procedure Act, the Court held that Arizona's law
does precisely what IRCA authorizes the states to do. 486 Accordingly, because Chief Justice
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Roberts believes that Arizona's law falls within the plain text of the preemption exception of
IRCA, Arizona's law is not preempted. 487
Unlike many of Justice Sotomayor's dissents and concurrences, in this case, her dissent
focuses entirely on a differing view of the legislative history of IRCA. Justice Sotomayor, in
opening her dissent, states, "In enacting the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986
(IRCA), Congress created a comprehensive scheme prohibiting the employment of illegal aliens
in the United States. The Court reads !RCA's saving clause-which preserves from preemption
state 'licensing and similar laws '-to permit states t~ to determine for themselves whether
someone has employed an unauthorized alien so long as they do so in conjunction with licensing
sanctions. This reading of the saving clause cannot be reconciled with the rest ofiRCA's
comprehensive scheme."488 This dissent thus points to Justice Sotomayor's jurisprudential view
that when determining the meaning of a term within a statute, it is necessary to look past its plain
meaning. As a result of looking at the comprehensive scheme enacted by Congress in IRCA,
Justice Sotomayor concludes that the saving clause can only be understood to preserve a state's
authority to impose licensing sanctions after a final federal determination that a person has
violated IRCA. 489
Justice Sotomayor reached this conclusion by reasoning that the plain text ofiRCA
expressly preempts states from imposing civil or criminal sanctions, other than through licensing
and similar laws, upon those who employ unauthorized aliens. 490 Justice Sotomayor emphasized
that Arizona's law imposes civil sanctions on employers, thus allowing the act to escape IRCA
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express preemption only if it falls within the licensing saving clause. 491 As Justice Sotomayor
explains, because the plain text of the saving clause is not clear, in that it does not define
"licensing," nor does it use the term "licensing" in any other provision. 492 As a result, Justice
Sotomayor reasons that it is necessary to look to the text of IRCA as a whole in order to
illuminate Congress' intent. 493
Justice Sotomayor then goes into an in depth analysis of the history of IRCA, and an
analysis of the evils in which it was enacted to counteract. 494 Through examining this history,
and analyzing !RCA's text in whole, Justice Sotomayor reasons that Arizona's law is expressly
preempted because: 1) Congress expressly displaced the myriad state laws that imposed civil and
criminal sanctions on employers, thus making it clear that Congress could not have made its
intention to preempt state and local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions any more clear; 2)
Congress centralized in the federal government enforcement of IRCA' s prohibition on the
knowing employment of unauthorized aliens; 3) Congress provided persons adversely affected
by an agency order with a right of review in the federal courts of appeals; 4) Congress created a
uniquely federal system by which employers must verify the work authorization status of new
hires; and 5) Congress created no mechanism for states to access information regarding an
alien's work authorization status for purposes of enforcing state prohibitions on the employment
of unauthorized aliens. 495 Justice Sotomayor thus concluded that these provisions collectively
demonstrate Congress' intent to build a centralized, exclusively federal scheme for determining
whether a person has employed an unauthorized alien. 496
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Justice Sotomayor then reasoned that IRCA's saving clause must be construed against
that backdrop. Concluding that the statutory scheme as a whole defeat's Arizona's and the
majority's reading of the saving clause, Justice Sotomayor stated that Congress would not
sensibly have permitted states to determine for themselves whether a person has employed an
unauthorized alien, while at the same time creating a specialized federal scheme for making such
a determination, withholding from the states the information necessary to make such a
determination. 497 As a result, Justice Sotomayor concluded that, she believes, the proper reading
of the saving clause to mean that states may impose licensing sanctions following a final federal
determination that a person has violated IRCA. 498
This dissent demonstrates Justice Sotomayor's philosophy on statutory construction, and
how to determine Congressional intent. Justice Sotomayor believes that the correct course of
action is to determine what the comprehensive scheme of the entire statute is when the plain
meaning of the clause or term at issue is not crystal clear. Such an investigation more clearly
indicates what Congress intended in enacting the statute, clause, or term at issue. This
demonstrates Justice Sotomayor's never-ending search for the truth, believing that a cursory
determination of plain meaning is not enough to determine Congressional intent in all but the
most unambiguous cases.

IV.

Conclusion
The cases reviewed here, read in light of Justice Sotomayor's upbringing and early life,

shed valuable light on her jurisprudence. Namely, in each opinion, concurrence, or dissent
written by Justice Sotomayor, she engages in a thorough analysis of the facts of the case, a
description of the case's procedural posture, an in-depth and technical explanation of the current
497
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law, an acknowledgment of the opposition's stance, an often narrow, commonsense application
of the law to the facts, and a conclusion. The cases analyzed here also establish Justice
Sotomayor's belief that statutory interpretation and the determination of Congressional intent
must be made in light of the complete, comprehensive history and scheme of the legislation.
This belief can be traced back to her childhood, and her fascination with Perry Mason and the
pursuit of the truth that led her to a career in law. These cases also reveal perhaps the most
prevalent jurisprudential philosophy held by Justice Sotomayor: that she believes the role of the
judge is to apply law, and not to make it. Justice Sotomayor firmly believes in judicial restraint.
As evidenced through her case law, her opinions often construe the law to a narrow application
of the facts of the case, and most of her dissents and concurrences emphasize the fact that she
does not think the Court narrowed its disposition sufficiently. As a result of the foregoing
analysis, Justice Sotomayor can be said to apply a commonsense application of the law to the
facts in front of her.
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